netdev - Re: RFC: Audit Kernel Container IDs

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Message-ID: <87d16tb2y5.fsf@xmission.com>
Date:   Thu, 14 Sep 2017 12:33:06 -0500
From:   ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To:     Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Cc:     cgroups@...r.kernel.org,
        Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Audit <linux-audit@...hat.com>,
        Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Aristeu Rozanski <arozansk@...hat.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>, jlayton@...hat.com,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, mszeredi@...hat.com,
        Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, trondmy@...marydata.com,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: RFC: Audit Kernel Container IDs

Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> writes:

> The trigger is a pseudo filesystem (proc, since PID tree already exists)
> write of a u64 representing the container ID to a file representing a
> process that will become the first process in a new container.
> This might place restrictions on mount namespaces required to define a
> container, or at least careful checking of namespaces in the kernel to
> verify permissions of the orchestrator so it can't change its own
> container ID.

Why a u64?

Why a proc filesystem write and not a magic audit message?
I don't like the fact that the proc filesystem entry is likely going to
be readable and abusable by non-audit contexts?

Why the ability to change the containerid?  What is the use case you are
thinking of there?

Eric