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Date:   Thu, 14 Sep 2017 12:33:06 -0500
From: (Eric W. Biederman)
To:     Richard Guy Briggs <>
        Linux Containers <>,
        Linux API <>,
        Linux Audit <>,
        Linux FS Devel <>,
        Linux Kernel <>,
        Linux Network Development <>,
        Aristeu Rozanski <>,
        David Howells <>,
        Eric Paris <>,,
        Andy Lutomirski <>,,
        Paul Moore <>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <>,
        Steve Grubb <>,,
        Al Viro <>
Subject: Re: RFC: Audit Kernel Container IDs

Richard Guy Briggs <> writes:

> The trigger is a pseudo filesystem (proc, since PID tree already exists)
> write of a u64 representing the container ID to a file representing a
> process that will become the first process in a new container.
> This might place restrictions on mount namespaces required to define a
> container, or at least careful checking of namespaces in the kernel to
> verify permissions of the orchestrator so it can't change its own
> container ID.

Why a u64?

Why a proc filesystem write and not a magic audit message?
I don't like the fact that the proc filesystem entry is likely going to
be readable and abusable by non-audit contexts?

Why the ability to change the containerid?  What is the use case you are
thinking of there?


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