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Message-ID: <1508860214.7674.3.camel@btinternet.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2017 16:50:14 +0100
From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@...nternet.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Cc: selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 5/5] selinux: Add SCTP support
On Fri, 2017-10-20 at 15:00 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Tue, 2017-10-17 at 14:59 +0100, Richard Haines wrote:
> > The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in:
> > Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.txt
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@...nternet.com>
> > ---
> > Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.txt | 108 +++++++++++++
> > security/selinux/hooks.c | 268
> > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> > security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 3 +-
> > security/selinux/include/netlabel.h | 9 +-
> > security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 +
> > security/selinux/netlabel.c | 52 ++++++-
> > 6 files changed, 427 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> > create mode 100644 Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.txt
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.txt
> > b/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.txt
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 0000000..32e0255
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.txt
> > @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
> > + SCTP SELinux Support
> > + ======================
> > +
> > +Security Hooks
> > +===============
> > +
> > +The Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt document describes how the
> > following
> > +sctp security hooks are utilised:
> > + security_sctp_assoc_request()
> > + security_sctp_bind_connect()
> > + security_sctp_sk_clone()
> > +
> > + security_inet_conn_established()
> > +
> > +
> > +Policy Statements
> > +==================
> > +The following class and permissions to support SCTP are available
> > within the
> > +kernel:
> > + class sctp_socket inherits socket { node_bind }
> > +
> > +whenever the following policy capability is enabled:
> > + policycap extended_socket_class;
> > +
> > +The SELinux SCTP support adds the additional permissions that are
> > explained
> > +in the sections below:
> > + association bindx connectx
> > +
> > +If userspace tools have been updated, SCTP will support the
> > portcon
> > +statement as shown in the following example:
> > + portcon sctp 1024-1036 system_u:object_r:sctp_ports_t:s0
> > +
> > +
> > +SCTP Bind, Connect and ASCONF Chunk Parameter Permission Checks
> > +================================================================
> > +The hook security_sctp_bind_connect() is called by SCTP to check
> > permissions
> > +required for ipv4/ipv6 addresses based on the @optname as follows:
> > +
> > + --------------------------------------------------------------
> > ----
> > + | BINDX Permission
> > Check |
> > + | @optname | @address
> > contains |
> > + |----------------------------|--------------------------------
> > ---|
> > + | SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses
> > |
> > + --------------------------------------------------------------
> > ----
> > +
> > + --------------------------------------------------------------
> > ----
> > + | BIND Permission
> > Checks |
> > + | @optname | @address
> > contains |
> > + |----------------------------|--------------------------------
> > ---|
> > + | SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6
> > address |
> > + | SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6
> > address |
> > + --------------------------------------------------------------
> > ----
> > +
> > + --------------------------------------------------------------
> > ----
> > + | CONNECTX Permission
> > Check |
> > + | @optname | @address
> > contains |
> > + |----------------------------|--------------------------------
> > ---|
> > + | SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses
> > |
> > + --------------------------------------------------------------
> > ----
> > +
> > + --------------------------------------------------------------
> > ----
> > + | CONNECT Permission
> > Checks |
> > + | @optname | @address
> > contains |
> > + |----------------------------|--------------------------------
> > ---|
> > + | SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT | Single ipv4 or ipv6
> > address |
> > + | SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses
> > |
> > + | SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY | Single ipv4 or ipv6
> > address |
> > + --------------------------------------------------------------
> > ----
> > +
> > +SCTP Peer Labeling
> > +===================
> > +An SCTP socket will only have one peer label assigned to it. This
> > will be
> > +assigned during the establishment of the first association. Once
> > the
> > peer
> > +label has been assigned, any new associations will have the
> > "association"
> > +permission validated by checking the socket peer sid against the
> > received
> > +packets peer sid to determine whether the association should be
> > allowed or
> > +denied.
> > +
> > +NOTES:
> > + 1) If peer labeling is not enabled, then the peer context will
> > always be
> > + SECINITSID_UNLABELED (unlabeled_t in Reference Policy).
> > +
> > + 2) As SCTP supports multiple endpoints with multi-homing on a
> > single socket
> > + it is recommended that peer labels are consistent.
> > +
> > + 3) getpeercon(3) may be used by userspace to retrieve the
> > sockets
> > peer
> > + context.
> > +
> > + 4) If using NetLabel be aware that if a label is assigned to a
> > specific
> > + interface, and that interface 'goes down', then the NetLabel
> > service
> > + will remove the entry. Therefore ensure that the network
> > startup scripts
> > + call netlabelctl(8) to set the required label (see netlabel-
> > config(8)
> > + helper script for details).
> > +
> > + 5) The NetLabel SCTP peer labeling rules apply as discussed in
> > the following
> > + set of posts tagged "netlabel" at: http://www.paul-moore.com
> > /b
> > log/t.
> > +
> > + 6) CIPSO is only supported for IPv4 addressing: socket(AF_INET,
> > ...)
> > + CALIPSO is only supported for IPv6 addressing:
> > socket(AF_INET6, ...)
> > +
> > + Note the following when testing CIPSO/CALIPSO:
> > + a) CIPSO will send an ICMP packet if an SCTP packet
> > cannot
> > be
> > + delivered because of an invalid label.
> > + b) CALIPSO does not send an ICMP packet, just silently
> > discards it.
> > +
> > + 7) IPSEC is not supported as rfc3554 - sctp/ipsec support has
> > not
> > been
> > + implemented in userspace (racoon(8) or ipsec_pluto(8)),
> > although the
> > + kernel supports SCTP/IPSEC.
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > index 33fd061..c3e9600 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@
> > #include <linux/tcp.h>
> > #include <linux/udp.h>
> > #include <linux/dccp.h>
> > +#include <linux/sctp.h>
> > +#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
> > #include <linux/quota.h>
> > #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
> > #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
> > @@ -4119,6 +4121,23 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct
> > sk_buff *skb,
> > break;
> > }
> >
> > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
> > + case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
> > + struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
> > +
> > + if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
> > + break;
> > +
> > + offset += ihlen;
> > + sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset,
> > sizeof(_sctph),
> > &_sctph);
> > + if (sh == NULL)
> > + break;
> > +
> > + ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
> > + ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +#endif
> > default:
> > break;
> > }
> > @@ -4192,6 +4211,19 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct
> > sk_buff *skb,
> > break;
> > }
> >
> > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
> > + case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
> > + struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
> > +
> > + sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset,
> > sizeof(_sctph),
> > &_sctph);
> > + if (sh == NULL)
> > + break;
> > +
> > + ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
> > + ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +#endif
> > /* includes fragments */
> > default:
> > break;
> > @@ -4381,6 +4413,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct
> > socket *sock, int family,
> > sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
> > sksec->sclass = sclass;
> > sksec->sid = sid;
> > + /* Allows detection of the first association on
> > this
> > socket */
> > + if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
> > + sksec->sctp_assoc_state =
> > SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
> > +
>
> What prevents this from interleaving with
> selinux_sctp_assoc_request()
> accesses to sctp_assoc_state?
I've added a spinlock in selinux_sctp_assoc_request()
>
> > err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk,
> > family);
> > }
> >
> > @@ -4401,11 +4437,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
> > *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
> > if (err)
> > goto out;
> >
> > - /*
> > - * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for
> > the port.
> > - * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet:
> > we just
> > - * check the first address now.
> > - */
> > + /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for
> > the port. */
> > family = sk->sk_family;
> > if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
> > char *addrp;
> > @@ -4417,7 +4449,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
> > *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
> > unsigned short snum;
> > u32 sid, node_perm;
> >
> > - if (family == PF_INET) {
> > + /*
> > + * sctp_bindx(3) calls via
> > selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
> > + * that validates multiple binding addresses.
> > Because of this
> > + * need to check address->sa_family as it is
> > possible to have
> > + * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family =
> > AF_INET.
> > + */
> > + if (family == PF_INET || address->sa_family ==
> > AF_INET) {
> > if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
> > {
> > err = -EINVAL;
> > goto out;
> > @@ -4471,6 +4509,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
> > *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
> > node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
> > break;
> >
> > + case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
> > + node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
> > + break;
> > +
> > default:
> > node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
> > break;
> > @@ -4485,7 +4527,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
> > *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
> > ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
> > ad.u.net->family = family;
> >
> > - if (family == PF_INET)
> > + if (family == PF_INET || address->sa_family ==
> > AF_INET)
> > ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4-
> > > sin_addr.s_addr;
> >
> > else
> > ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
> > @@ -4510,10 +4552,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct
> > socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
> > return err;
> >
> > /*
> > - * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission
> > for the port.
> > + * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect
> > permission
> > + * for the port.
> > */
> > if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
> > - sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
> > + sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
> > + sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
> > struct common_audit_data ad;
> > struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
> > struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
> > @@ -4521,7 +4565,14 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct
> > socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
> > unsigned short snum;
> > u32 sid, perm;
> >
> > - if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
> > + /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via
> > + *selinux_sctp_bind_connect() that validates
> > multiple
> > + * connect addresses. Because of this need to
> > check
> > + * address->sa_family as it is possible to have
> > + * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family =
> > AF_INET.
> > + */
> > + if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET ||
> > + address->sa_family ==
> > AF_INET) {
> > addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
> > if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
> > return -EINVAL;
> > @@ -4534,11 +4585,21 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct
> > socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
> > }
> >
> > err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum,
> > &sid);
> > +
> > if (err)
> > goto out;
> >
> > - perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
> > - TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT :
> > DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
> > + switch (sksec->sclass) {
> > + case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
> > + perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
> > + break;
> > + case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
> > + perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
> > + break;
> > + case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
> > + perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
> > + break;
> > + }
> >
> > ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
> > ad.u.net = &net;
> > @@ -4815,7 +4876,8 @@ static int
> > selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user
> > *op
> > u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
> >
> > if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
> > - sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
> > + sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
> > + sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
> > peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
> > if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
> > return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> > @@ -4928,6 +4990,183 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
> > *sk, struct socket *parent)
> > sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
> > }
> >
> > +/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT or INIT_ACK chunk */
> > +static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> > + struct sk_buff *skb,
> > + int sctp_cid)
> > +{
> > + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk-
> > >sk_security;
> > + struct common_audit_data ad;
> > + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
> > + u8 peerlbl_active;
> > + u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
> > + u32 conn_sid;
> > + int err;
> > +
> > + if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
> > +
> > + if (peerlbl_active) {
> > + /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if
> > there
> > are
> > + * no peer labels, see
> > security_net_peersid_resolve().
> > + */
> > + err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk-
> > > sk_family,
> >
> > + &peer_sid);
> > +
> > + if (err)
> > + return err;
> > +
> > + if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
> > + peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
> > + sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
> > +
> > + /* Here as first association on socket. As the
> > peer
> > SID
> > + * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node
> > checks),
> > + * then it is approved by policy and used as the
> > primary
> > + * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
> > + */
> > + sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
> > + } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
> > + /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to
> > enforce
> > + * consistency among the peer SIDs.
> > + */
> > + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
> > + ad.u.net = &net;
> > + ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
> > + err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid,
> > sksec-
> > > sclass,
> >
> > + SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
> > + if (err)
> > + return err;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (sctp_cid == SCTP_CID_INIT) {
> > + /* Have INIT when incoming connect(2),
> > sctp_connectx(3)
> > + * or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association already
> > present),
> > + * so compute the MLS component for the connection
> > and store
> > + * the information in ep. This will be used by
> > SCTP
> > TCP type
> > + * sockets and peeled off connections as they
> > cause
> > a new
> > + * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone()
> > will then
> > + * plug this into the new socket.
> > + */
> > + err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid,
> > &conn_sid);
> > + if (err)
> > + return err;
> > +
> > + ep->secid = conn_sid;
> > + ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
> > +
> > + /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO
> > options. */
> > + return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
> > + }
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or
> > connecting
> > + * based on their @optname.
> > + */
> > +static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
> > + struct sockaddr *address,
> > + int addrlen)
> > +{
> > + int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
> > + void *addr_buf;
> > + struct sockaddr *addr;
> > + struct socket *sock;
> > +
> > + if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + switch (optname) {
> > + case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
> > + err = sock_has_perm(sk, SCTP_SOCKET__BINDX);
> > + break;
> > + case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
> > + err = sock_has_perm(sk, SCTP_SOCKET__CONNECTX);
> > + break;
> > + /* These need SOCKET__BIND or SOCKET__CONNECT permissions
> > that will
> > + * be checked later.
> > + */
> > + case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
> > + case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
> > + case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
> > + case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
> > + case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + err = -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > + if (err)
> > + return err;
> > +
> > + /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6
> > */
> > + sock = sk->sk_socket;
> > + addr_buf = address;
> > +
> > + while (walk_size < addrlen) {
> > + addr = addr_buf;
> > + switch (addr->sa_family) {
> > + case AF_INET:
> > + len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
> > + break;
> > + case AF_INET6:
> > + len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
> > + }
> > +
> > + err = -EINVAL;
> > + switch (optname) {
> > + /* Bind checks */
> > + case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
> > + case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
> > + case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
> > + err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr,
> > len);
> > + break;
> > + /* Connect checks */
> > + case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
> > + case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
> > + case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
> > + case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
> > + err = selinux_socket_connect(sock, addr,
> > len);
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (err)
> > + return err;
> > +
> > + addr_buf += len;
> > + walk_size += len;
> > + }
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or
> > sctp_peeloff(3). */
> > +static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct
> > sock *sk,
> > + struct sock *newsk)
> > +{
> > + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> > + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
> > +
> > + /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then
> > call
> > + * the non-sctp clone version.
> > + */
> > + if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
> > + return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
> > +
> > + newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
> > + newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
> > + newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
> > + newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
> > +}
> > +
> > static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct
> > sk_buff
> > *skb,
> > struct request_sock *req)
> > {
> > @@ -6416,6 +6655,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list
> > selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security,
> > selinux_sk_clone_security),
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
> > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request,
> > selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
> > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
> > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect,
> > selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request,
> > selinux_inet_conn_request),
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established,
> > selinux_inet_conn_established),
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> > b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> > index b9fe343..b4b10da 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> > +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> > @@ -173,7 +173,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] =
> > {
> > { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
> > { "sctp_socket",
> > { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
> > - "node_bind", NULL } },
> > + "node_bind", "name_connect", "association", "bindx",
> > + "connectx", NULL } },
> > { "icmp_socket",
> > { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
> > "node_bind", NULL } },
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
> > b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
> > index 75686d5..835a0d6 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
> > +++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
> > @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
> > #include <linux/skbuff.h>
> > #include <net/sock.h>
> > #include <net/request_sock.h>
> > +#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
> >
> > #include "avc.h"
> > #include "objsec.h"
> > @@ -53,7 +54,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff
> > *skb,
> > int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
> > u16 family,
> > u32 sid);
> > -
> > +int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> > + struct sk_buff *skb);
> > int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16
> > family);
> > void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
> > int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16
> > family);
> > @@ -114,6 +116,11 @@ static inline int
> > selinux_netlbl_conn_setsid(struct sock *sk,
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > +static inline int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct
> > sctp_endpoint *ep,
> > + struct sk_buff
> > *skb)
> > +{
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > static inline int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct
> > request_sock *req,
> > u16 family)
> > {
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> > b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> > index 6ebc61e..660f270 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> > +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> > @@ -130,6 +130,11 @@ struct sk_security_struct {
> > u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
> > u32 peer_sid; /* SID of peer */
> > u16 sclass; /* sock security class
> > */
> > +
> > + enum { /* SCTP association
> > state */
> > + SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET = 0,
> > + SCTP_ASSOC_SET,
> > + } sctp_assoc_state;
> > };
> >
> > struct tun_security_struct {
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> > b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> > index aaba667..7d5aa15 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> > @@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff
> > *skb,
> > sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
> > if (sk != NULL) {
> > struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk-
> > >sk_security;
> > +
> > if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
> > return 0;
> > secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, sid);
> > @@ -271,6 +272,41 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct
> > sk_buff
> > *skb,
> > }
> >
> > /**
> > + * selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request - Label an incoming sctp
> > association.
> > + * @ep: incoming association endpoint.
> > + * @skb: the packet.
> > + *
> > + * Description:
> > + * A new incoming connection is represented by @ep, ......
> > + * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
> > + *
> > + */
> > +int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> > + struct sk_buff *skb)
> > +{
> > + int rc;
> > + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
> > + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk-
> > >sk_security;
> > +
> > + if (ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
> > + ep->base.sk->sk_family !=
> > PF_INET6)
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
> > + rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(ep->secid, &secattr);
> > + if (rc != 0)
> > + goto assoc_request_return;
> > +
> > + rc = netlbl_sctp_setattr(ep->base.sk, skb, &secattr);
> > + if (rc == 0)
> > + sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
> > +
> > +assoc_request_return:
> > + netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
> > + return rc;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Label an incoming stream
> > connection
> > * @req: incoming connection request socket
> > *
> > @@ -481,7 +517,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct
> > socket *sock,
> > */
> > int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr
> > *addr)
> > {
> > - int rc;
> > + int rc, already_owned_by_user = 0;
> > struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> > struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
> >
> > @@ -489,7 +525,16 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock
> > *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
> > sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
> > return 0;
> >
> > - lock_sock(sk);
> > + /* Note: When called via connect(2) this happens before
> > the
> > socket
> > + * protocol layer connect operation and @sk is not locked,
> > HOWEVER,
> > + * when called by the SCTP protocol layer via
> > sctp_connectx(3),
> > + * sctp_sendmsg(3) or sendmsg(2), @sk is locked. Therefore
> > check if
> > + * @sk owned already.
> > + */
> > + if (sock_owned_by_user(sk) && sksec->sclass ==
> > SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
> > + already_owned_by_user = 1;
> > + else
> > + lock_sock(sk);
>
> Conditional locking is generally considered harmful. I'd split the
> cases for the different callers, and use a common helper for both.
I've now split this as suggested.
>
> >
> > /* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the
> > address family
> > * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we
> > want
> > to reset
> > @@ -510,6 +555,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock
> > *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
> > sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
> >
> > socket_connect_return:
> > - release_sock(sk);
> > + if (!already_owned_by_user)
> > + release_sock(sk);
> > return rc;
> > }
>
> --
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