[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20171024190723.GD27853@fieldses.org>
Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2017 15:07:23 -0400
From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>
To: Jeff Layton <jlayton@...hat.com>
Cc: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@...key.org>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <garsilva@...eddedor.com>,
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@...marydata.com>,
Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@...app.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
linux-nfs list <linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: sunrpc: svcauth_gss: use BUG_ON instead of if
condition followed by BUG
On Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 02:18:52PM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> On Tue, 2017-10-24 at 13:53 -0400, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 01:26:49PM -0400, Weston Andros Adamson wrote:
> > > Is there a reason to BUG() in these places? Couldn't we WARN_ON_ONCE and return an error?
> >
> > I think the BUG() will just kill an nfsd thread that isn't holding any
> > interesting locks.
> >
>
> Not necessarily. If panic_on_oops is set (and it usually is in
> "production" setups), it'll crash the box there.
Maybe they're getting what they asked for?
> > The failures look unlikely. (Except for that read_u32... return, I
> > wonder if we're missing a check there.)
>
> Agreed, looks like you only hit an error if the read attempts to go out
> of bounds. In principle that shouldn't ever happen (and I haven't seen
> any reports of it).
>
> Still...I agree with Dros that it's better to handle this without
> oopsing if we can. We can return an error from either of those
> functions. A sane error and a WARN_ONCE would be better here.
OK, OK, OK.
There are also some more BUGs that could use looking into if anyone
wants to.
--b.
commit eb754930662f
Author: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@...hat.com>
Date: Tue Oct 24 14:58:11 2017 -0400
rpc: remove some BUG()s
It would be kinder to WARN() and recover in several spots here instead
of BUG()ing.
Also, it looks like the read_u32_from_xdr_buf() call could actually
fail, though it might require a broken (or malicious) client, so convert
that to just an error return.
Reported-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@...key.org>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@...hat.com>
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
index 7b1ee5a0b03c..73165e9ca5bf 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -855,11 +855,13 @@ unwrap_integ_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct g
return stat;
if (integ_len > buf->len)
return stat;
- if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &integ_buf, 0, integ_len))
- BUG();
+ if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &integ_buf, 0, integ_len)) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return stat;
+ }
/* copy out mic... */
if (read_u32_from_xdr_buf(buf, integ_len, &mic.len))
- BUG();
+ return stat;
if (mic.len > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE)
return stat;
mic.data = kmalloc(mic.len, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1611,8 +1613,10 @@ svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_integ(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
BUG_ON(integ_len % 4);
*p++ = htonl(integ_len);
*p++ = htonl(gc->gc_seq);
- if (xdr_buf_subsegment(resbuf, &integ_buf, integ_offset, integ_len))
- BUG();
+ if (xdr_buf_subsegment(resbuf, &integ_buf, integ_offset, integ_len)) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base == NULL) {
if (resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
goto out_err;
Powered by blists - more mailing lists