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Message-Id: <20171103.101108.660889899668900453.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Fri, 03 Nov 2017 10:11:08 +0900 (KST)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: tom@...ntonium.net
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, rohit@...ntonium.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 net-next] ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and
Destination options
From: Tom Herbert <tom@...ntonium.net>
Date: Mon, 30 Oct 2017 14:16:00 -0700
> RFC 8200 (IPv6) defines Hop-by-Hop options and Destination options
> extension headers. Both of these carry a list of TLVs which is
> only limited by the maximum length of the extension header (2048
> bytes). By the spec a host must process all the TLVs in these
> options, however these could be used as a fairly obvious
> denial of service attack. I think this could in fact be
> a significant DOS vector on the Internet, one mitigating
> factor might be that many FWs drop all packets with EH (and
> obviously this is only IPv6) so an Internet wide attack might not
> be so effective (yet!).
...
> This patch adds configurable limits to Destination and Hop-by-Hop
> options. There are three limits that may be set:
> - Limit the number of options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options
> extension header.
> - Limit the byte length of a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options
> extension header.
> - Disallow unrecognized options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination
> options extension header.
>
> The limits are set in corresponding sysctls:
>
> ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_cnt
> ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_cnt
> ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_len
> ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_len
...
> Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@...ntonium.net>
Applied to net-next, let's see how this goes.
Thanks.
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