Message-ID: <a4352d69-c50e-163d-91a8-89a7a123e046@fb.com>
Date:   Tue, 14 Nov 2017 06:51:00 +0800
From:   Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...com>
To:     Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Lawrence Brakmo <brakmo@...com>,
        Vlad Dumitrescu <vlad@...itrescu.ro>,
        "davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>
CC:     "netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Craig Gallek <kraigatgoog@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next] bpf: expose sk_priority through struct
 bpf_sock_ops

On 11/14/17 4:20 AM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> On 11/13/2017 09:09 PM, Lawrence Brakmo wrote:
>> On 11/13/17, 11:01 AM, "Vlad Dumitrescu" <vlad@...itrescu.ro> wrote:
>>
>>     On Sat, Nov 11, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...com> wrote:
>>     >
>>     > On 11/12/17 4:46 AM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
>>     >>
>>     >> On 11/11/2017 05:06 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>     >>>
>>     >>> On 11/11/17 6:07 AM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
>>     >>>>
>>     >>>> On 11/10/2017 08:17 PM, Vlad Dumitrescu wrote:
>>     >>>>>
>>     >>>>> From: Vlad Dumitrescu <vladum@...gle.com>
>>     >>>>>
>>     >>>>> Allows BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS programs to read sk_priority.
>>     >>>>>
>>     >>>>> Signed-off-by: Vlad Dumitrescu <vladum@...gle.com>
>>     >>>>> ---
>>     >>>>>   include/uapi/linux/bpf.h       |  1 +
>>     >>>>>   net/core/filter.c              | 11 +++++++++++
>>     >>>>>   tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h |  1 +
>>     >>>>>   3 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
>>     >>>>>
>>     >>>>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
>>     >>>>> index e880ae6434ee..9757a2002513 100644
>>     >>>>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
>>     >>>>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
>>     >>>>> @@ -947,6 +947,7 @@ struct bpf_sock_ops {
>>     >>>>>       __u32 local_ip6[4];    /* Stored in network byte order */
>>     >>>>>       __u32 remote_port;    /* Stored in network byte order */
>>     >>>>>       __u32 local_port;    /* stored in host byte order */
>>     >>>>> +    __u32 priority;
>>     >>>>>   };
>>     >>>>>     /* List of known BPF sock_ops operators.
>>     >>>>> diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
>>     >>>>> index 61c791f9f628..a6329642d047 100644
>>     >>>>> --- a/net/core/filter.c
>>     >>>>> +++ b/net/core/filter.c
>>     >>>>> @@ -4449,6 +4449,17 @@ static u32 sock_ops_convert_ctx_access(enum
>>     >>>>> bpf_access_type type,
>>     >>>>>           *insn++ = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, si->dst_reg, si->dst_reg,
>>     >>>>>                         offsetof(struct sock_common, skc_num));
>>     >>>>>           break;
>>     >>>>> +
>>     >>>>> +    case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops, priority):
>>     >>>>> +        BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct sock, sk_priority) != 4);
>>     >>>>> +
>>     >>>>> +        *insn++ = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF(
>>     >>>>> +                        struct bpf_sock_ops_kern, sk),
>>     >>>>> +                      si->dst_reg, si->src_reg,
>>     >>>>> +                      offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops_kern, sk));
>>     >>>>> +        *insn++ = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, si->dst_reg, si->dst_reg,
>>     >>>>> +                      offsetof(struct sock, sk_priority));
>>     >>>>> +        break;
>>     >>>>
>>     >>>>
>>     >>>> Hm, I don't think this would work, I actually think your initial patch
>>     >>>> was ok.
>>     >>>> bpf_setsockopt() as well as bpf_getsockopt() check for sk_fullsock(sk)
>>     >>>> right
>>     >>>> before accessing options on either socket or TCP level, and bail out
>>     >>>> with error
>>     >>>> otherwise; in such cases we'd read something else here and assume it's
>>     >>>> sk_priority.
>>     >>>
>>     >>>
>>     >>> even if it's not fullsock, it will just read zero, no? what's a problem
>>     >>> with that?
>>     >>> In non-fullsock hooks like BPF_SOCK_OPS_PASSIVE_ESTABLISHED_CB
>>     >>> the program author will know that it's meaningless to read sk_priority,
>>     >>> so returning zero with minimal checks is fine.
>>     >>> While adding extra runtime if (sk_fullsock(sk)) is unnecessary,
>>     >>> since the safety is not compromised.
>>     >>
>>     >>
>>     >> Hm, on my kernel, struct sock has the 4 bytes sk_priority at offset 440,
>>     >> struct request_sock itself is only 232 byte long in total, and the struct
>>     >> inet_timewait_sock is 208 byte long, so you'd be accessing out of bounds
>>     >> that way, so it cannot be ignored and assumed zero.
>>     >
>>     >
>>     > I thought we always pass fully allocated sock but technically not fullsock yet. My mistake. We do: tcp_timeout_init((struct sock *)req))
>>     > so yeah ctx rewrite approach won't work.
>>     > Let's go back to access via helper.
>>     >
>>
>>     TIL. Thanks!
>>
>>     Is there anything else needed from me to get the helper approach accepted?
>>
>> I plan to add access to TCP state variables (cwnd, rtt, etc.) and I have been thinking
>> about this issue. I think it is possible to access it directly as long as we use a value
>> like 0xffffffff to represent an invalid value (e.g. not fullsock). The ctx rewrite just
>> needs to add a conditional to determine what to return. I would probably add a
>> field into the internal kernel struct to indicate if it is fullsock or not (we should
>> know when we call tcp_call_bpf whether it is a fullsock or not based on context).
>>
>> Let me do a sample patch that I can send for review and get feedback from
>> Alexi and Daniel.
>
> Agree, if the mov op from the ctx rewrite to read(/write) a sk member, for
> example, is just a BPF_W, then we know upper reg bits are zero anyway for the
> success case, so we might be able to utilize this for writing a signed error
> back to the user if !fullsk.

it can be __u64 in bpf_sock_ops too, while real read is 32-bit or less,
then guaranteed no conflicts if we return (s64)-enoent or (s64)-einval
in case of !fullsock.
I like the idea of copying boolean value of sk_fullsock() into hidden
part of bpf_sock_ops_kern, since it's been accessed by tcp_call_bpf()
anyway.

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