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Message-ID: <20171219041201.1979983-3-ast@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2017 20:11:54 -0800
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
To: "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
CC: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Edward Cree <ecree@...arflare.com>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
<kernel-team@...com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf 2/9] bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in check_alu_op()
From: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Distinguish between
BPF_ALU64|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, sign-extended to 64-bit)
and BPF_ALU|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, zero-padded to 64-bit);
only perform sign extension in the first case.
Starting with v4.14, this is exploitable by unprivileged users as long as
the unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl isn't set.
Debian assigned CVE-2017-16995 for this issue.
v3:
- add CVE number (Ben Hutchings)
Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@...arflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 625e358ca765..c086010ae51e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2408,7 +2408,13 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
* remember the value we stored into this reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
- __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
+ if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
+ __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
+ insn->imm);
+ } else {
+ __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
+ (u32)insn->imm);
+ }
}
} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
--
2.9.5
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