netdev - [PATCH 1/3] net: Fix possible race in peernet2id

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Message-ID: <151386201910.3724.7199367937841370542.stgit@localhost.localdomain>
Date:   Thu, 21 Dec 2017 16:13:52 +0300
From:   Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com>
To:     netdev@...r.kernel.org, davem@...emloft.net
Cc:     eric.dumazet@...il.com, ktkhai@...tuozzo.com, ebiederm@...ssion.com
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] net: Fix possible race in peernet2id_alloc()

peernet2id_alloc() is racy without rtnl_lock() as atomic_read(&peer->count)
under net->nsid_lock does not guarantee, peer is alive:

rcu_read_lock()
peernet2id_alloc()                            ..
  spin_lock_bh(&net->nsid_lock)               ..
  atomic_read(&peer->count) == 1              ..
  ..                                          put_net()
  ..                                            cleanup_net()
  ..                                              for_each_net(tmp)
  ..                                                spin_lock_bh(&tmp->nsid_lock)
  ..                                                __peernet2id(tmp, net) == -1
  ..                                                    ..
  ..                                                    ..
    __peernet2id_alloc(alloc == true)                   ..
  ..                                                    ..
rcu_read_unlock()                                       ..
..                                                synchronize_rcu()
..                                                kmem_cache_free(net)

After the above situation, net::netns_id contains id pointing to freed memory,
and any other dereferencing by the id will operate with this freed memory.

Currently, peernet2id_alloc() is used under rtnl_lock() everywhere except
ovs_vport_cmd_fill_info(), and this race can't occur. But peernet2id_alloc()
is generic interface, and better we fix it before someone really starts
use it in wrong context.

Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com>
---
 net/core/net_namespace.c |   23 +++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c
index 60a71be75aea..6a4eab438221 100644
--- a/net/core/net_namespace.c
+++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c
@@ -221,17 +221,32 @@ static void rtnl_net_notifyid(struct net *net, int cmd, int id);
  */
 int peernet2id_alloc(struct net *net, struct net *peer)
 {
-	bool alloc;
+	bool alloc = false, alive = false;
 	int id;
 
-	if (atomic_read(&net->count) == 0)
-		return NETNSA_NSID_NOT_ASSIGNED;
 	spin_lock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
-	alloc = atomic_read(&peer->count) == 0 ? false : true;
+	/* Spinlock guarantees we never hash a peer to net->netns_ids
+	 * after idr_destroy(&net->netns_ids) occurs in cleanup_net().
+	 */
+	if (atomic_read(&net->count) == 0) {
+		id = NETNSA_NSID_NOT_ASSIGNED;
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * When peer is obtained from RCU lists, we may race with
+	 * its cleanup. Check whether it's alive, and this guarantees
+	 * we never hash a peer back to net->netns_ids, after it has
+	 * just been idr_remove()'d from there in cleanup_net().
+	 */
+	if (maybe_get_net(peer))
+		alive = alloc = true;
 	id = __peernet2id_alloc(net, peer, &alloc);
+unlock:
 	spin_unlock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
 	if (alloc && id >= 0)
 		rtnl_net_notifyid(net, RTM_NEWNSID, id);
+	if (alive)
+		put_net(peer);
 	return id;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(peernet2id_alloc);