[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <87y3ll2y9y.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2017 12:18:33 -0600
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, davem@...emloft.net, eric.dumazet@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND 1/3] net: Fix possible race in peernet2id_alloc()
Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com> writes:
> peernet2id_alloc() is racy without rtnl_lock() as atomic_read(&peer->count)
> under net->nsid_lock does not guarantee, peer is alive:
>
> rcu_read_lock()
> peernet2id_alloc() ..
> spin_lock_bh(&net->nsid_lock) ..
> atomic_read(&peer->count) == 1 ..
> .. put_net()
> .. cleanup_net()
> .. for_each_net(tmp)
> .. spin_lock_bh(&tmp->nsid_lock)
> .. __peernet2id(tmp, net) == -1
> .. ..
> .. ..
> __peernet2id_alloc(alloc == true) ..
> .. ..
> rcu_read_unlock() ..
> .. synchronize_rcu()
> .. kmem_cache_free(net)
>
> After the above situation, net::netns_id contains id pointing to freed memory,
> and any other dereferencing by the id will operate with this freed memory.
>
> Currently, peernet2id_alloc() is used under rtnl_lock() everywhere except
> ovs_vport_cmd_fill_info(), and this race can't occur. But peernet2id_alloc()
> is generic interface, and better we fix it before someone really starts
> use it in wrong context.
Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
I have already made a clear objection to the first unnecessary and
confusing hunk. Simply resending the muddle headed code doesn't make it
better.
Eric
> Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com>
> ---
> net/core/net_namespace.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c
> index 60a71be75aea..6a4eab438221 100644
> --- a/net/core/net_namespace.c
> +++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c
> @@ -221,17 +221,32 @@ static void rtnl_net_notifyid(struct net *net, int cmd, int id);
> */
> int peernet2id_alloc(struct net *net, struct net *peer)
> {
> - bool alloc;
> + bool alloc = false, alive = false;
> int id;
>
> - if (atomic_read(&net->count) == 0)
> - return NETNSA_NSID_NOT_ASSIGNED;
> spin_lock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
> - alloc = atomic_read(&peer->count) == 0 ? false : true;
> + /* Spinlock guarantees we never hash a peer to net->netns_ids
> + * after idr_destroy(&net->netns_ids) occurs in cleanup_net().
> + */
> + if (atomic_read(&net->count) == 0) {
> + id = NETNSA_NSID_NOT_ASSIGNED;
> + goto unlock;
> + }
> + /*
> + * When peer is obtained from RCU lists, we may race with
> + * its cleanup. Check whether it's alive, and this guarantees
> + * we never hash a peer back to net->netns_ids, after it has
> + * just been idr_remove()'d from there in cleanup_net().
> + */
> + if (maybe_get_net(peer))
> + alive = alloc = true;
> id = __peernet2id_alloc(net, peer, &alloc);
> +unlock:
> spin_unlock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
> if (alloc && id >= 0)
> rtnl_net_notifyid(net, RTM_NEWNSID, id);
> + if (alive)
> + put_net(peer);
> return id;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(peernet2id_alloc);
Powered by blists - more mailing lists