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Message-ID: <20180106090019.GD4380@kroah.com>
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 10:00:19 +0100
From: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, peterz@...radead.org,
Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@....inr.ac.ru>, tglx@...utronix.de,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
alan@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 14/18] ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative
execution
On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 05:11:10PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> Static analysis reports that 'offset' may be a user controlled value
> that is used as a data dependency reading from a raw_frag_vec buffer.
> In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block
> speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue further
> reads based on an invalid '*(rfv->c + offset)' value.
>
> Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova.
I thought we "proved" that this patch was not needed at all, based on
previous review. It doesn't look like that review cycle got
incorporated into this patch series at all, I guess I have to go back
and do it all again :(
thanks,
greg k-h
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