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Message-Id: <20180107.210447.857032573629357172.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Sun, 07 Jan 2018 21:04:47 -0500 (EST)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: tglx@...utronix.de
Cc: James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com, w@....eu,
gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk, alexei.starovoitov@...il.com,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, dan.j.williams@...el.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
ak@...ux.intel.com, arnd@...db.de, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
peterz@...radead.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, mingo@...hat.com,
hpa@...or.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed
access_ok
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 19:31:41 +0100 (CET)
> 2) Alexei's analyis is purely based on the public information of the google
> zero folks. If it would be complete and the only attack vector all fine.
>
> If not and I doubt it is, we're going to regret this decision faster
> than we made it and this is not the kind of play field where we can
> afford that.
Please state this more clearly.
Do you know about other attack vectors and just are not allowed to
talk about them?
Or is this, ironically, speculation?
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