netdev - Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

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Message-ID: <20180108115502.GA6176@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date:   Mon, 8 Jan 2018 12:55:02 +0100
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To:     Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc:     Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Alan Cox <alan.cox@...el.com>,
        Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        Solomon Peachy <pizza@...ftnet.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@...glemail.com>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        linux-scsi <linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@....inr.ac.ru>,
        Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@...el.com>,
        "Linux-media@...r.kernel.org" <linux-media@...r.kernel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.com>,
        Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@...il.com>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, qla2xxx-upstream@...gic.com,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@...nel.org>,
        Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Kalle Valo <kvalo@...eaurora.org>,
        Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@...cle.com>,
        Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org, Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@...asonboard.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative
 execution

On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 11:43:42AM +0000, Alan Cox wrote:
> On Mon, 8 Jan 2018 11:08:36 +0100
> Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> wrote:
> 
> > On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 10:30:16PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:  
> > > > In at least one place (mpls) you are patching a fast path.  Compile out
> > > > or don't load mpls by all means.  But it is not acceptable to change the
> > > > fast path without even considering performance.  
> > > 
> > > Performance matters greatly, but I need help to identify a workload
> > > that is representative for this fast path to see what, if any, impact
> > > is incurred. Even better is a review that says "nope, 'index' is not
> > > subject to arbitrary userspace control at this point, drop the patch."  
> > 
> > I think we're focussing a little too much on pure userspace. That is, we
> > should be saying under the attackers control. Inbound network packets
> > could equally be under the attackers control.
> 
> Inbound network packets don't come with a facility to read back and do
> cache timimg. 

But could they not be used in conjunction with a local task to prime the
stuff?