netdev - Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation

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Message-ID: <20180109102129.GG4297@arm.com>
Date:   Tue, 9 Jan 2018 10:21:30 +0000
From:   Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...com>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        kernel-team <kernel-team@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation

Hi Linus,

On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 10:49:01AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 9:05 AM, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com> wrote:
> >
> > I'm a little worried that in the presence of some CPU/compiler
> > optimisations, the masking may effectively be skipped under speculation.
> > So I'm not sure how robust this is going to be.
> 
> Honestly, I think the masking is a hell of a lot more robust than any
> of the "official" fixes.
> 
> More generic data speculation (as opposed to control speculation) is
> 
>  (a) mainly academic masturbation
> 
>  (b) hasn't even been shown to be a good idea even in _theory_ yet
> (except for the "completely unreal hardware" kind of theory where
> people assume some data oracle)
> 
>  (c) isn't actually done in any real CPU's today that I'm aware of
> (unless you want to call the return stack data speculation).
> 
> and the thing is, we should really not then worry about "... but maybe
> future CPU's will be more aggressive", which is the traditional worry
> in these kinds of cases.
> 
> Why? Because quite honestly, any future CPU's that are more aggressive
> about speculating things like this are broken shit that we should call
> out as such, and tell people not to use.
> 
> Seriously.
> 
> In this particular case, we should be very much aware of future CPU's
> being more _constrained_, because CPU vendors had better start taking
> this thing into account.
> 
> So the masking approach is FUNDAMENTALLY SAFER than the "let's try to
> limit control speculation".
> 
> If somebody can point to a CPU that actually speculates across an
> address masking operation, I will be very surprised. And unless you
> can point to that, then stop trying to dismiss the masking approach.

Whilst I agree with your comments about future CPUs, this stuff is further
out of academia than you might think. We're definitely erring on the
belt-and-braces side of things at the moment, so let me go check what's
*actually* been built and I suspect we'll be able to make the masking work.

Stay tuned...

Will