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Message-ID: <2ad44938-8199-d6f6-b9ac-38ecb8ad8287@virtuozzo.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 13:48:26 +0300
From: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com>
To: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
davem@...emloft.net
Cc: ebiederm@...ssion.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] net: Add BUG_ON() to get_net()
On 10.01.2018 12:58, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Wed, 2018-01-10 at 10:37 +0300, Kirill Tkhai wrote:
>> On 09.01.2018 21:52, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>>> On Tue, 2018-01-09 at 18:00 +0300, Kirill Tkhai wrote:
>>>> Since people may mistakenly obtain destroying net
>>>> from net_namespace_list and from net::netns_ids
>>>> without checking for its net::counter, let's protect
>>>> against such situations and insert BUG_ON() to stop
>>>> move on after this.
>>>>
>>>> Panic is better, than memory corruption and undefined
>>>> behavior.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> include/net/net_namespace.h | 2 +-
>>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/include/net/net_namespace.h b/include/net/net_namespace.h
>>>> index 10f99dafd5ac..ff0e47471d5b 100644
>>>> --- a/include/net/net_namespace.h
>>>> +++ b/include/net/net_namespace.h
>>>> @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ void __put_net(struct net *net);
>>>>
>>>> static inline struct net *get_net(struct net *net)
>>>> {
>>>> - atomic_inc(&net->count);
>>>> + BUG_ON(atomic_inc_return(&net->count) <= 1);
>>>> return net;
>>>> }
>>>
>>>
>>> Why not simply use refcount_t instead of duplicating its logic?
>>
>> The main goal of the change is to catch rare races happening on production nodes
>> with real load and to prevent memory corruption. You can't simply use refcount_t
>> primitives, as there is no appropriate primitive with BUG_ON() among them. WARN_ON()
>> from the primitives doesn't protect from memory corruption.
>>
>> Also, keep in mind, that CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL is usually disabled on no-debug kernel.
>> I've checked both Fedora and Debian. So, the only possibility to catch such the races,
>> if someone really happy meets them on test kernel and test workload, which is usually
>> is very unlikely.
>>
>
> Keep in mind that most of these bugs are found by syzkaller or other
> fuzzer bots, that have CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL enabled.
>
> Do not rely on production workload to find such bug for you, coverage
> is very very low.
>
> Resistance is futile, because this refcount will eventually be
> converted some day.
OK, I'll do v3.
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