netdev - Re: [PATCH net] sctp: return error if the asoc has been peeled off in sctp_wait_for

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Message-ID: <CADvbK_cPpd7Q2=9C_nnNeA5butjHX47ATyA0cgnueKcDCaCo3w@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 16 Jan 2018 01:20:28 +0800
From:   Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>
To:     Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
Cc:     network dev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org,
        davem <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] sctp: return error if the asoc has been peeled off in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf

On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 9:06 PM, Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 05:01:36PM +0800, Xin Long wrote:
>> After commit cea0cc80a677 ("sctp: use the right sk after waking up from
>> wait_buf sleep"), it may change to lock another sk if the asoc has been
>> peeled off in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf.
>>
>> However, the asoc's new sk could be already closed elsewhere, as it's in
>> the sendmsg context of the old sk that can't avoid the new sk's closing.
>> If the sk's last one refcnt is held by this asoc, later on after putting
>> this asoc, the new sk will be freed, while under it's own lock.
>>
>> This patch is to revert that commit, but fix the old issue by returning
>> error under the old sk's lock.
>>
>> Fixes: cea0cc80a677 ("sctp: use the right sk after waking up from wait_buf sleep")
>> Reported-by: syzbot+ac6ea7baa4432811eb50@...kaller.appspotmail.com
>> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>
>> ---
>>  net/sctp/socket.c | 16 ++++++----------
>>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
>> index 15ae018..feb2ca6 100644
>> --- a/net/sctp/socket.c
>> +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
>> @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
>>  static int sctp_writeable(struct sock *sk);
>>  static void sctp_wfree(struct sk_buff *skb);
>>  static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p,
>> -                             size_t msg_len, struct sock **orig_sk);
>> +                             size_t msg_len);
>>  static int sctp_wait_for_packet(struct sock *sk, int *err, long *timeo_p);
>>  static int sctp_wait_for_connect(struct sctp_association *, long *timeo_p);
>>  static int sctp_wait_for_accept(struct sock *sk, long timeo);
>> @@ -1977,7 +1977,7 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len)
>>       timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
>>       if (!sctp_wspace(asoc)) {
>>               /* sk can be changed by peel off when waiting for buf. */
>> -             err = sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(asoc, &timeo, msg_len, &sk);
>> +             err = sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(asoc, &timeo, msg_len);
>>               if (err) {
>>                       if (err == -ESRCH) {
>>                               /* asoc is already dead. */
>> @@ -8022,12 +8022,12 @@ void sctp_sock_rfree(struct sk_buff *skb)
>>
>>  /* Helper function to wait for space in the sndbuf.  */
>>  static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p,
>> -                             size_t msg_len, struct sock **orig_sk)
>> +                             size_t msg_len)
>>  {
>>       struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
>> -     int err = 0;
>>       long current_timeo = *timeo_p;
>>       DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
>> +     int err = 0;
>>
>>       pr_debug("%s: asoc:%p, timeo:%ld, msg_len:%zu\n", __func__, asoc,
>>                *timeo_p, msg_len);
>> @@ -8056,17 +8056,13 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p,
>>               release_sock(sk);
>>               current_timeo = schedule_timeout(current_timeo);
>>               lock_sock(sk);
>> -             if (sk != asoc->base.sk) {
>> -                     release_sock(sk);
>> -                     sk = asoc->base.sk;
>> -                     lock_sock(sk);
>> -             }
>> +             if (sk != asoc->base.sk)
>> +                     goto do_error;
> Is this a safe comparison to make (thinking in terms both of non-cache coherent
> arches, or, more likely, of cases where the sock slab reuses an object leading
> to the same pointer).  Would it be better to have a single point of freeing the
> sock and use the SOCK_DEAD flag here?
Hi, Neil, You meant leading to 'asoc->base.sk is the same as sk' ?
Here sk is being used in it's sendmsg context, this sk can't even be closed.
it's impossible that the sock slab may reuses this sk(still alive) to
asoc->base.sk in somewhere?

>
> Neil
>
>>
>>               *timeo_p = current_timeo;
>>       }
>>
>>  out:
>> -     *orig_sk = sk;
>>       finish_wait(&asoc->wait, &wait);
>>
>>       /* Release the association's refcnt.  */
>> --
>> 2.1.0
>>
>>