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Message-ID: <1516197374.4184.5.camel@linux.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 13:56:14 +0000
From: Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...com
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation
> That fixes bpf side of "Variant 1: bounds check bypass (CVE-2017-
> 5753)" on
> all architectures with and without JIT.
For Intel we believe this is true for all family 6 Core, Atom and
Knights processors. If that ceases to be the case in future then Intel
will provide guidance beforehand.
For non x86 you need to check what level of data speculation anyone is
doing. I know some Power did data speculation. Your statement may well
be true but it would be nice to see AMD, ARM, Power, Sparc etc acks on
it.
Alan
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