netdev - Re: [PATCH 0/3] Check gso_size of packets when forwarding

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Message-ID: <87fu735ms5.fsf@linkitivity.dja.id.au>
Date:   Fri, 19 Jan 2018 00:17:30 +1100
From:   Daniel Axtens <dja@...ens.net>
To:     Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>, Pravin Shelar <pshelar@....org>
Cc:     Linux Kernel Network Developers <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Manish.Chopra@...ium.com, ovs dev <dev@...nvswitch.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] Check gso_size of packets when forwarding

Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com> writes:

> On 2018年01月18日 16:28, Pravin Shelar wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 6:09 PM, Daniel Axtens <dja@...ens.net> wrote:
>>> When regular packets are forwarded, we validate their size against the
>>> MTU of the destination device. However, when GSO packets are
>>> forwarded, we do not validate their size against the MTU. We
>>> implicitly assume that when they are segmented, the resultant packets
>>> will be correctly sized.
>>>
>>> This is not always the case.
>>>
>>> We observed a case where a packet received on an ibmveth device had a
>>> GSO size of around 10kB. This was forwarded by Open vSwitch to a bnx2x
>>> device, where it caused a firmware assert. This is described in detail
>>> at [0] and was the genesis of this series. Rather than fixing it in
>>> the driver, this series fixes the forwarding path.
>>>
>> Are there any other possible forwarding path in networking stack? TC
>> is one subsystem that could forward such a packet to the bnx2x device,
>> how is that handled ?
>
> Yes, so it looks to me we should do the check in e.g netif_needs_gso() 
> before passing it to hardware. And bnx2x needs to set its gso_max_size 
> correctly.

I don't think gso_max_size is quite the same. If I understand
net/ipv4/tcp.c correctly, gso_max_size is supposed to cap the total
length of the skb, not the length of each segmented packet. The problem
for the bnx2x card is the length of the segment, not the overall length.

>
> Btw, looks like this could be triggered from a guest which is a DOS. We 
> need request a CVE for this.
>

You are correct about how this can be triggered: in fact it came to my
attention because a network packet from one LPAR (PowerVM virtual
machine) brought down the card attached to a different LPAR. It didn't
occur to me that it was potentially a security issue. I am talking with
the security team at Canonical regarding this.

Regards,
Daniel

> Thanks
>
>>
>>> To fix this:
>>>
>>>   - Move a helper in patch 1.
>>>
>>>   - Validate GSO segment lengths in is_skb_forwardable() in the GSO
>>>     case, rather than assuming all will be well. This fixes bridges.
>>>     This is patch 2.
>>>
>>>   - Open vSwitch uses its own slightly specialised algorithm for
>>>     checking lengths. Wire up checking for that in patch 3.
>>>
>>> [0]: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/859410/
>>>
>>> Cc: Manish.Chopra@...ium.com
>>> Cc: dev@...nvswitch.org
>>>
>>> Daniel Axtens (3):
>>>    net: move skb_gso_mac_seglen to skbuff.h
>>>    net: is_skb_forwardable: validate length of GSO packet segments
>>>    openvswitch: drop GSO packets that are too large
>>>
>>>   include/linux/skbuff.h  | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>>>   net/core/dev.c          |  7 ++++---
>>>   net/core/skbuff.c       | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>   net/openvswitch/vport.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>>>   net/sched/sch_tbf.c     | 10 ----------
>>>   5 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> --
>>> 2.14.1
>>>