netdev - Re: [net-next v3 0/2] eBPF seccomp filters

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLdOcrn16q9pQ7JwTf88AVsL0o5LMJ=4P6vRN36u-_k_g@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 26 Feb 2018 15:20:15 -0800
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
Cc:     Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
        Jessica Frazelle <me@...sfraz.com>, cpuguy83@...il.com,
        Tom Hromatka <tom.hromatka@...cle.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>
Subject: Re: [net-next v3 0/2] eBPF seccomp filters

On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 3:04 PM, Alexei Starovoitov
<alexei.starovoitov@...il.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 07:26:54AM +0000, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
>> This patchset enables seccomp filters to be written in eBPF. Although, this
>> [...]
> The main statement I want to hear from seccomp maintainers before
> proceeding any further on this that enabling eBPF in seccomp won't lead
> to seccomp folks arguing against changes in bpf core (like verifier)
> just because it's used by seccomp.
> It must be spelled out in the commit log with explicit Ack.

The primary thing I'm concerned about with eBPF and seccomp is
side-effects from eBPF programs running at syscall time. This is an
extremely sensitive area, and I want to be sure there won't be
feature-creep here that leads to seccomp getting into a bad state.

As long as seccomp can continue have its own verifier, I *think* this
will be fine, though, again I remain concerned about maps, etc. I'm
still reviewing these patches and how they might provide overlap with
Tycho's needs too, etc.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security