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Message-ID: <CALCETrVo61UOGHJ6AgrLN_AyzUYuz-JRgET4d6ut-ErwUg_vZA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 17:36:34 +0000
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Thomas Graf <tgraf@...g.ch>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock
programs per process hierarchy
On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 5:30 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 2/27/2018 8:39 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 5:32 AM, Alexei Starovoitov
>> <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com> wrote:
>>> [ Snip ]
>> An earlier version of the patch set used the seccomp filter chain.
>> Mickaël, what exactly was wrong with that approach other than that the
>> seccomp() syscall was awkward for you to use? You could add a
>> seccomp_add_landlock_rule() syscall if you needed to.
>>
>> As a side comment, why is this an LSM at all, let alone a non-stacking
>> LSM? It would make a lot more sense to me to make Landlock depend on
>> having LSMs configured in but to call the landlock hooks directly from
>> the security_xyz() hooks.
>
> Please, no. It is my serious intention to have at least the
> infrastructure blob management in within a release or two, and
> I think that's all Landlock needs. The security_xyz() hooks are
> sufficiently hackish as it is without unnecessarily adding more
> special cases.
>
>
What do you mean by "infrastructure blob management"?
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