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Message-ID: <20180308222249.GA42129@davejwatson-mba>
Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 14:22:49 -0800
From: Dave Watson <davejwatson@...com>
To: Boris Pismenny <borisp@...lanox.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Tom Herbert <tom@...ntonium.net>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
<herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
<netdev@...r.kernel.org>, <ilyal@...lanox.com>,
Atul Gupta <atul.gupta@...lsio.com>,
Vakul Garg <vakul.garg@....com>,
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>,
Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 4/5] tls: RX path for ktls
On 03/08/18 09:48 PM, Boris Pismenny wrote:
> Hi Dave,
>
> On 03/08/18 18:50, Dave Watson wrote:
> > Add rx path for tls software implementation.
> >
> > recvmsg, splice_read, and poll implemented.
> >
> > An additional sockopt TLS_RX is added, with the same interface as
> > TLS_TX. Either TLX_RX or TLX_TX may be provided separately, or
> > together (with two different setsockopt calls with appropriate keys).
> >
> > Control messages are passed via CMSG in a similar way to transmit.
> > If no cmsg buffer is passed, then only application data records
> > will be passed to userspace, and EIO is returned for other types of
> > alerts.
> >
> > EBADMSG is passed for decryption errors, and E2BIG is passed for framing
> > errors. Both are unrecoverable.
>
> I think E2BIG is for too long argument list. EMSGSIZE might be more
> appropriate.
Sounds good.
> Also, we must check that the record is not too short (cipher specific).
> For TLS1.2 with AES-GCM the minimum length is 8 (IV) + 16 (TAG).
> The correct error for this case is EBADMSG, like a decryption failure.
>
> Also, how about bad TLS version (e.g. not TLS1.2)?
> A separate error type is required for bad version, because it triggers a
> unique alert in libraries such as OpenSSL.
> I thought of using EINVAL for bad version. What do you think?
Ah, I did not realize there was a separate alert for that, sounds good.
>
> I wonder if we should provide a more flexible method of obtaining errors for
> the future.
> Maybe use a special CMSG for errors?
> This CMSG will be triggered only after the socket enters the error state.
I'm not opposed to this in principle, but without a concrete use am
hesitant to add it. I don't know of any other error codes that could
be returned besides the ones discussed above.
> > ....
> > +
> > +int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
> > + struct msghdr *msg,
> > + size_t len,
> > + int nonblock,
> > + int flags,
> > + int *addr_len)
> > +{
> > + struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
> > + struct tls_sw_context *ctx = tls_sw_ctx(tls_ctx);
> > + unsigned char control;
> > + struct strp_msg *rxm;
> > + struct sk_buff *skb;
> > + ssize_t copied = 0;
> > + bool cmsg = false;
> > + int err = 0;
> > + long timeo;
> Maybe try to read from the error queue here?
Sure.
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