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Date:   Thu, 8 Mar 2018 17:38:12 -0800
From:   Linus Torvalds <>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <>
Cc:     Kees Cook <>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <>,
        Djalal Harouni <>,
        Al Viro <>,
        "David S. Miller" <>,
        Daniel Borkmann <>,
        Greg KH <>,
        "Luis R. Rodriguez" <>,
        Network Development <>,
        LKML <>,
        kernel-team <>,
        Linux API <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next] modules: allow modprobe load regular elf binaries

On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 4:59 PM, Andy Lutomirski <> wrote:
> Also, I don't see how this is any more exploitable than any other
> init_module().

Absolutely. If Kees doesn't trust the files to be loaded, an
executable - even if it's running with root privileges and in the
initns - is still fundamentally weaker than a kernel module.

So I don't understand the security argument AT ALL. It's nonsensical.
The executable loading does all the same security checks that the
module loading does, including the signing check.

And the whole point is that we can now do things with building and
loading a ebpf rule instead of having a full module.


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