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Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 05:00:37 -0400 From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> To: cgroups@...r.kernel.org, containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@...hat.com>, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org Cc: luto@...nel.org, jlayton@...hat.com, carlos@...hat.com, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, dhowells@...hat.com, simo@...hat.com, eparis@...isplace.org, serge@...lyn.com, ebiederm@...ssion.com, madzcar@...il.com, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> Subject: [RFC PATCH ghak32 V2 10/13] audit: add containerid support for seccomp and anom_abend records Add container ID auxiliary records to secure computing and abnormal end standalone records. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> --- kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 7103d23..2f02ed9 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2571,6 +2571,7 @@ static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab) void audit_core_dumps(long signr) { struct audit_buffer *ab; + struct audit_context *context = audit_alloc_local(); if (!audit_enabled) return; @@ -2578,19 +2579,22 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr) if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */ return; - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); if (unlikely(!ab)) return; audit_log_task(ab); audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr); audit_log_end(ab); + audit_log_container_info(context, "abend", audit_get_containerid(current)); + audit_free_context(context); } void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) { struct audit_buffer *ab; + struct audit_context *context = audit_alloc_local(); - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP); + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP); if (unlikely(!ab)) return; audit_log_task(ab); @@ -2598,6 +2602,8 @@ void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) signr, syscall_get_arch(), syscall, in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code); audit_log_end(ab); + audit_log_container_info(context, "seccomp", audit_get_containerid(current)); + audit_free_context(context); } struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) -- 1.8.3.1
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