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Message-ID: <20180503012402.GK5105@localhost.localdomain>
Date: Wed, 2 May 2018 22:24:02 -0300
From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com>
To: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@....edu>
Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@....edu>, Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>,
Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
"open list:SCTP PROTOCOL" <linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:NETWORKING [GENERAL]" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] sctp: fix a potential missing-check bug
On Wed, May 02, 2018 at 08:15:45PM -0500, Wenwen Wang wrote:
> In sctp_setsockopt_maxseg(), the integer 'val' is compared against min_len
> and max_len to check whether it is in the appropriate range. If it is not,
> an error code -EINVAL will be returned. This is enforced by a security
> check. But, this check is only executed when 'val' is not 0. In fact, if
> 'val' is 0, it will be assigned with a new value (if the return value of
> the function sctp_id2assoc() is not 0) in the following execution. However,
> this new value of 'val' is not checked before it is used to assigned to
> asoc->user_frag. That means it is possible that the new value of 'val'
> could be out of the expected range. This can cause security issues
> such as buffer overflows, e.g., the new value of 'val' is used as an index
> to access a buffer.
>
> This patch inserts a check for the new value of 'val' to see if it is in
> the expected range. If it is not, an error code -EINVAL will be returned.
>
> Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@....edu>
> ---
> net/sctp/socket.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
?
This patch is the same as previous one. git send-email <old file>
maybe?
Marcelo
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