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Message-ID: <20180503181712.GA7443@embeddedor.com>
Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 13:17:12 -0500
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
To: Chas Williams <3chas3@...il.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: linux-atm-general@...ts.sourceforge.net, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Subject: [PATCH] atm: zatm: Fix potential Spectre v1
pool can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/atm/zatm.c:1462 zatm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue
'zatm_dev->pool_info' (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing pool before using it to index
zatm_dev->pool_info
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
---
drivers/atm/zatm.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/atm/zatm.c b/drivers/atm/zatm.c
index 1ef67db..9c9a229 100644
--- a/drivers/atm/zatm.c
+++ b/drivers/atm/zatm.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "uPD98401.h"
#include "uPD98402.h"
@@ -1458,6 +1459,8 @@ static int zatm_ioctl(struct atm_dev *dev,unsigned int cmd,void __user *arg)
return -EFAULT;
if (pool < 0 || pool > ZATM_LAST_POOL)
return -EINVAL;
+ pool = array_index_nospec(pool,
+ ZATM_LAST_POOL + 1);
spin_lock_irqsave(&zatm_dev->lock, flags);
info = zatm_dev->pool_info[pool];
if (cmd == ZATM_GETPOOLZ) {
--
2.7.4
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