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Message-Id: <20180504.125404.2298451507679774278.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Fri, 04 May 2018 12:54:04 -0400 (EDT)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: gustavo@...eddedor.com
Cc: 3chas3@...il.com, linux-atm-general@...ts.sourceforge.net,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] atm: zatm: Fix potential Spectre v1
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 13:17:12 -0500
> pool can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> drivers/atm/zatm.c:1462 zatm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue
> 'zatm_dev->pool_info' (local cap)
>
> Fix this by sanitizing pool before using it to index
> zatm_dev->pool_info
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Applied and queued up for -stable.
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