netdev - Re: [PATCHv2] net/xfrm: Revert "[XFRM]: Do not add a state whose SPI is zero to the SPI hash."

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Message-ID: <20180507062037.kxuh2yqfu4z5rkgd@gauss3.secunet.de>
Date:   Mon, 7 May 2018 08:20:37 +0200
From:   Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
To:     Dmitry Safonov <dima@...sta.com>
CC:     <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <0x7f454c46@...il.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@...ux-ipv6.org>,
        YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv2] net/xfrm: Revert "[XFRM]: Do not add a state whose SPI
 is zero to the SPI hash."

On Fri, May 04, 2018 at 02:20:09AM +0100, Dmitry Safonov wrote:
> This reverts commit 7b4dc3600e48 ("[XFRM]: Do not add a state whose SPI
> is zero to the SPI hash.").
> 
> Zero SPI is legal and defined for IPcomp.
> We shouldn't omit adding the state to SPI hash because it'll not be
> possible to delete or lookup for it afterward:
> __xfrm_state_insert() obviously doesn't add hash for zero
> SPI in xfrm.state_byspi, and xfrm_user_state_lookup() will fail as
> xfrm_state_lookup() does lookups by hash.
> 
> It also isn't possible to workaround from userspace as
> xfrm_id_proto_match() will be always true for ah/esp/comp protos.
> 
> v1 link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/<20180502020220.2027-1-dima@...sta.com>
> 
> Cc: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@...ux-ipv6.org>
> Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>
> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
> Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
> Suggested-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@...sta.com>

This patch does much more than reverting the commit you mentioned.
It removes all the logic that is needed to handle larval SAs.

The result is a disaster, all connections that are negotiated
by an IKE deamon stop working.

On traffic triggered connections the IKE deamon inserts a new SA
for each packet that matches a policy.