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Message-ID: <20180516071224.GB11416@outlook.office365.com>
Date:   Wed, 16 May 2018 00:12:25 -0700
From:   Andrei Vagin <avagin@...tuozzo.com>
To:     netdev@...r.kernel.org, Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: linux-next: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tun_chr_close

Hi Jason,

I think the problem is in "tun: hold a tun socket during ptr_ring_cleanup".

Pls take a look at the attached patch.


On Tue, May 15, 2018 at 11:28:25PM -0700, Andrei Vagin wrote:
> We run CRIU tests on linux-next regularly and today we caught this bug:
> 
> https://travis-ci.org/avagin/linux/jobs/379450631
> 
> [   50.264837] ==================================================================
> [   50.264986] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire.isra.30+0x1ad4/0x1bb0
> [   50.265088] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88018e1728f8 by task criu/1819
> [   50.265167] 
> [   50.265249] CPU: 0 PID: 1819 Comm: criu Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5-next-20180515+ #1
> [   50.265251] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> [   50.265252] Call Trace:
> [   50.265262]  dump_stack+0x71/0xab
> [   50.265265]  ? __lock_acquire.isra.30+0x1ad4/0x1bb0
> [   50.265271]  print_address_description+0x6a/0x270
> [   50.265273]  ? __lock_acquire.isra.30+0x1ad4/0x1bb0
> [   50.265275]  kasan_report+0x237/0x360
> [   50.265278]  __lock_acquire.isra.30+0x1ad4/0x1bb0
> [   50.265285]  ? register_netdev+0x30/0x30
> [   50.265288]  lock_acquire+0x10b/0x2a0
> [   50.265294]  ? tun_chr_close+0x1d7/0x4c0
> [   50.265298]  ? kfree+0xd6/0x1f0
> [   50.265303]  _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30
> [   50.265306]  ? tun_chr_close+0x1d7/0x4c0
> [   50.265308]  tun_chr_close+0x1d7/0x4c0
> [   50.265313]  ? fcntl_setlk+0xaf0/0xaf0
> [   50.265320]  __fput+0x251/0x770
> [   50.265324]  task_work_run+0x10e/0x180
> [   50.265330]  exit_to_usermode_loop+0xcb/0xf0
> [   50.265332]  do_syscall_64+0x21d/0x280
> [   50.265335]  ? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x88/0x130
> [   50.265338]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
> [   50.265342] RIP: 0033:0x1494fa6f93f0
> [   50.265342] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d b8 9b 20 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 59 e0 20 00 00 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 0e fa ff ff 48 89 04 24 
> [   50.265388] RSP: 002b:00007ffd229fe7f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
> [   50.265391] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00001494fa6f93f0
> [   50.265393] RDX: 00007ffd229fe80c RSI: 00000000400454da RDI: 0000000000000004
> [   50.265395] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000420b R09: 0000000000000000
> [   50.265396] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00001494fab116a0
> [   50.265398] R13: 0000000000000d06 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
> [   50.265400] 
> [   50.265476] Allocated by task 1819:
> [   50.265554]  kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
> [   50.265556]  __kmalloc+0x13a/0x250
> [   50.265561]  sk_prot_alloc+0xd3/0x250
> [   50.265564]  sk_alloc+0x35/0x9d0
> [   50.265566]  tun_chr_open+0x7b/0x5a0
> [   50.265570]  misc_open+0x313/0x480
> [   50.265573]  chrdev_open+0x1d6/0x4b0
> [   50.265575]  do_dentry_open+0x6ae/0xee0
> [   50.265578]  path_openat+0xce6/0x2890
> [   50.265580]  do_filp_open+0x17a/0x270
> [   50.265582]  do_sys_open+0x203/0x340
> [   50.265584]  do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x280
> [   50.265586]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
> [   50.265587] 
> [   50.265667] Freed by task 1819:
> [   50.265745]  __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180
> [   50.265747]  kfree+0xd6/0x1f0
> [   50.265750]  __sk_destruct+0x46f/0x580
> [   50.265752]  tun_chr_close+0x330/0x4c0
> [   50.265754]  __fput+0x251/0x770
> [   50.265756]  task_work_run+0x10e/0x180
> [   50.265758]  exit_to_usermode_loop+0xcb/0xf0
> [   50.265760]  do_syscall_64+0x21d/0x280
> [   50.265762]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
> [   50.265762] 
> [   50.265840] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88018e172200
> [   50.265840]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2048 of size 2048
> [   50.265927] The buggy address is located 1784 bytes inside of
> [   50.265927]  2048-byte region [ffff88018e172200, ffff88018e172a00)
> [   50.266011] The buggy address belongs to the page:
> [   50.266089] page:ffffea0006385c00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
> [   50.266178] flags: 0x17fff8000008100(slab|head)
> [   50.266257] raw: 017fff8000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800f000f
> [   50.266342] raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff8801d9016800 0000000000000000
> [   50.266425] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> [   50.266501] 
> [   50.266590] Memory state around the buggy address:
> [   50.266693]  ffff88018e172780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> [   50.266776]  ffff88018e172800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> [   50.266860] >ffff88018e172880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> [   50.266943]                                                                 ^
> [   50.267020]  ffff88018e172900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> [   50.267103]  ffff88018e172980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> [   50.267192] ==================================================================
> [   50.267275] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

View attachment "0001-tun-hold-a-tun-socket-during-ptr_ring_cleanup.patch" of type "text/plain" (1868 bytes)

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