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Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2018 15:16:29 +0200
From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
To: netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Tom Herbert <tom@...ntonium.net>,
Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com>
Subject: [PATCH net] kcm: fix races on sk_receive_queue
KCM removes the packets from sk_receive_queue in requeue_rx_msgs()
without acquiring any lock. Moreover, in R() when the MSG_PEEK
flag is not present, the skb is peeked and dequeued with two
separate, non-atomic, calls.
The above create room for races, which SYZBOT has been able to
exploit, causing list corruption and kernel oops:
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 8484 Comm: syz-executor919 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc7+ #74
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:1844 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_unlink+0xc1/0x160 net/core/skbuff.c:2921
RSP: 0018:ffff8801d012f6f0 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: 0000000000000286 RBX: ffff8801d6e073c0 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000008
RBP: ffff8801d012f718 R08: ffffed0038bb3b6d R09: ffffed0038bb3b6c
R10: ffffed0038bb3b6c R11: ffff8801c5d9db63 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8801c5d9db60 R15: ffff8801d012fce0
FS: 0000000000ab7880(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020e5b000 CR3: 00000001c31fb000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
kcm_recvmsg+0x48d/0x590 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1160
sock_recvmsg_nosec+0x8c/0xb0 net/socket.c:802
___sys_recvmsg+0x2b6/0x680 net/socket.c:2279
__sys_recvmmsg+0x2f9/0xb80 net/socket.c:2391
do_sys_recvmmsg+0xe4/0x190 net/socket.c:2472
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2485 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2481 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:2481
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4417a9
RSP: 002b:00007ffe27282838 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000004417a9
RDX: 00000000040000f7 RSI: 00000000200002c0 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000020000200 R09: 00007ffe272829f8
R10: 0000000000000060 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000000001f3
R13: 000000000001f871 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 00 00 00 49 8d 7d 08 4c 8b 63 08 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c7
43 08 00 00 00 00 48 89 f9 48 c7 03 00 00 00 00 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 11 00
75 5b 4c 89 e1 4d 89 65 08 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc
RIP: __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:1844 [inline] RSP: ffff8801d012f6f0
RIP: skb_unlink+0xc1/0x160 net/core/skbuff.c:2921 RSP: ffff8801d012f6f0
To fix the above, we need to use the locked version of the socket dequeue
helper in requeue_rx_msgs() and kcm_wait_data is changed to dequeue
the available skb when not peeking.
RFC -> v1:
- use skb_dequeue(), as suggested by Tom
- explicitly close the race between skb_peek and skb_unlink
Fixes: ab7ac4eb9832 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+278279efdd2730dd14bf@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
---
This is an RFC, since I'm really new to this area, anyway the syzport
reported success in testing the proposed fix.
This is very likely a scenario where the upcoming skb->prev,next -> list_head
conversion would have helped a lot, thanks to list poisoning and list debug
---
net/kcm/kcmsock.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/kcm/kcmsock.c b/net/kcm/kcmsock.c
index d3601d421571..dd2d02bb35ae 100644
--- a/net/kcm/kcmsock.c
+++ b/net/kcm/kcmsock.c
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static void requeue_rx_msgs(struct kcm_mux *mux, struct sk_buff_head *head)
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct kcm_sock *kcm;
- while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(head))) {
+ while ((skb = skb_dequeue(head))) {
/* Reset destructor to avoid calling kcm_rcv_ready */
skb->destructor = sock_rfree;
skb_orphan(skb);
@@ -1080,12 +1080,17 @@ static int kcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
return err;
}
-static struct sk_buff *kcm_wait_data(struct sock *sk, int flags,
+static struct sk_buff *kcm_wait_data(struct sock *sk, int flags, bool peek,
long timeo, int *err)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
- while (!(skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue))) {
+ for (;; ) {
+ skb = peek ? skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue) :
+ skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
+ if (skb)
+ break;
+
if (sk->sk_err) {
*err = sock_error(sk);
return NULL;
@@ -1116,6 +1121,7 @@ static int kcm_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct kcm_sock *kcm = kcm_sk(sk);
+ bool peek = flags & MSG_PEEK;
int err = 0;
long timeo;
struct strp_msg *stm;
@@ -1126,7 +1132,7 @@ static int kcm_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
lock_sock(sk);
- skb = kcm_wait_data(sk, flags, timeo, &err);
+ skb = kcm_wait_data(sk, flags, peek, timeo, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
@@ -1142,7 +1148,7 @@ static int kcm_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
goto out;
copied = len;
- if (likely(!(flags & MSG_PEEK))) {
+ if (likely(!peek)) {
KCM_STATS_ADD(kcm->stats.rx_bytes, copied);
if (copied < stm->full_len) {
if (sock->type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
@@ -1157,7 +1163,6 @@ static int kcm_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
/* Finished with message */
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
KCM_STATS_INCR(kcm->stats.rx_msgs);
- skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
@@ -1186,7 +1191,7 @@ static ssize_t kcm_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
lock_sock(sk);
- skb = kcm_wait_data(sk, flags, timeo, &err);
+ skb = kcm_wait_data(sk, flags, true, timeo, &err);
if (!skb)
goto err_out;
--
2.17.1
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