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Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2018 16:13:23 -0400
From: Byoungyoung Lee <byoungyoung@...due.edu>
To: netdev@...r.kernel.org, ubraun@...ux.ibm.com,
linux-s390@...r.kernel.org
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
DaeRyong Jeong <threeearcat@...il.com>,
Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@...il.com>,
Basavesh Ammanaghatta Shivakumar <bammanag@...due.edu>,
syzkaller@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in smc_ioctl
Attached C repro code as well as its kernel config. It takes about 10-30
seconds to reproduce.
C repro: https://kiwi.cs.purdue.edu/static/race-fuzzer/null-ptr-deref-smc_ioctl.c
kernel config (v4.18-rc3): https://kiwi.cs.purdue.edu/static/race-fuzzer/null-ptr-deref-smc_ioctl.c
[ 172.890255]
==================================================================
[ 172.892790] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in smc_ioctl+0x5c5/0x7a0
[ 172.894579] Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000020 by task repro.exe/5499
[ 172.896648]
[ 172.897213] CPU: 0 PID: 5499 Comm: repro.exe Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3#1
[ 172.899216] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[ 172.902409] Call Trace:
[ 172.903173] dump_stack+0x18f/0x26c
[ 172.904202] ? dump_stack_print_info.cold.2+0x40/0x40
[ 172.905712] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 172.906926] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x9c/0x120
[ 172.908111] ? vprintk_func+0x81/0xe7
[ 172.909202] ? smc_ioctl+0x5c5/0x7a0
[ 172.910244] kasan_report.cold.7+0x13b/0x2f5
[ 172.911472] __asan_load4+0x78/0x80
[ 172.912506] smc_ioctl+0x5c5/0x7a0
[ 172.913463] ? smc_tx_prepared_sends+0x300/0x300
[ 172.914722] ? find_held_lock+0xca/0xf0
[ 172.915809] ? avc_has_extended_perms+0x6d6/0xec0
[ 172.917072] ? lock_downgrade+0x390/0x390
[ 172.918156] ? lock_release+0x550/0x550
[ 172.919205] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 172.920329] ? rcu_report_qs_rnp+0x410/0x410
[ 172.921504] ? __lock_is_held+0x39/0xc0
[ 172.922569] ? avc_has_extended_perms+0x82b/0xec0
[ 172.923887] sock_do_ioctl+0xcc/0x380
[ 172.924897] ? compat_ifr_data_ioctl+0x150/0x150
[ 172.926052] ? avc_ss_reset+0x100/0x100
[ 172.927033] ? lock_downgrade+0x390/0x390
[ 172.928057] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 172.929076] ? rcu_is_watching+0x9d/0xe0
[ 172.930081] ? rcu_report_qs_rnp+0x410/0x410
[ 172.931174] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x53/0x90
[ 172.932464] sock_ioctl+0x2bd/0x5a0
[ 172.933363] ? dlci_ioctl_set+0x40/0x40
[ 172.934348] ? ___might_sleep+0x1a4/0x280
[ 172.935372] ? check_same_owner+0x240/0x240
[ 172.936452] ? expand_files.part.8+0x750/0x750
[ 172.937535] ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x500/0x500
[ 172.938684] ? dlci_ioctl_set+0x40/0x40
[ 172.939605] do_vfs_ioctl+0x188/0xf80
[ 172.940510] ? ioctl_preallocate+0x200/0x200
[ 172.941538] ? selinux_capable+0x40/0x40
[ 172.942475] ? get_unused_fd_flags+0xdb/0x110
[ 172.943535] ? __x64_sys_futex+0x3cb/0x540
[ 172.944536] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4+0x16/0x20
[ 172.945818] ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0
[ 172.946636] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x43/0x50
[ 172.947570] do_syscall_64+0x182/0x540
[ 172.948490] ? syscall_return_slowpath+0x3f0/0x3f0
[ 172.949596] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4+0x16/0x20
[ 172.950798] ? syscall_return_slowpath+0x266/0x3f0
[ 172.951867] ? mark_held_locks+0x25/0xb0
[ 172.952798] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x59/0xbe
[ 172.953967] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0xb5/0x120
[ 172.955059] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[ 172.956121] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 172.957263] RIP: 0033:0x452a09
[ 172.957961] Code: e8 dc f8 01 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00
48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f
05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 2b af fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
[ 172.962330] RSP: 002b:00007f40bc5cacd8 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[ 172.963917] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000452a09
[ 172.965405] RDX: 0000000020000180 RSI: 0000000000008905 RDI: 0000000000000058
[ 172.966883] RBP: 00007f40bc5cad10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 172.968369] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 172.969862] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f40bc5cb9c0 R15: 00007f40bc5cb700
Thanks,
Byoungyoung
Byoungyoung Lee <lifeasageek@...il.com> writes:
> Reporting the crash: KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in smc_ioctl
>
> This crash has been found in v4.18-rc3 using RaceFuzzer (a modified
> version of Syzkaller), which we describe more at the end of this
> report.
>
> Our analysis shows that the race occurs when invoking two syscalls
> concurrently, ioctl$sock_inet_tcp_SIOCATMARK() and listen(). More
> specifically, two code lines, `if (smc->sk.sk_state == SMC_LISTEN)` in
> smc_ioctl() and `sk->sk_state = SMC_LISTEN` in smc_listen() are racing
> as switching its execution order results in different execution
> behaviors, which in turn raises null-ptr-deref. More details on the
> thread interleaving raising the crash are follows.
>
> Thread interleaving:
> CPU0 (smc_ioctl) CPU1 (smc_listen)
> ===== =====
>
> // net/smc/af_smc.c#L1524 (v4.18-rc3)
> if (smc->sk.sk_state == SMC_LISTEN)
>
> // net/smc/af_smc.c#L1106 (v4.18-rc3)
> sk->sk_state = SMC_LISTEN;
> // ...
> release_sock(lsk);
>
> if (smc->sk.sk_state == SMC_INIT ||
> smc->sk.sk_state == SMC_CLOSED) {
> // ...
> } else {
>
> // ...
> answ = smc_curs_diff(conn->rmb_desc->len, // null-ptr-deref
> &cons, &urg) == 1;
> }
>
> Note that all the other cases in smc_ioctl() seem to have similar race
> issues. For example, running the SIOCOUTQNSD case leads to yet another
> crashes, such as "KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in smc_tx_prepared_sends"
> or "general protection fault in smc_tx_prepared_sends". In particular,
> "general protection fault in smc_tx_prepared_sends" is recently
> spotted by Syzkaller
> (https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=02252298a71214aad90c45a91f86ad3d3c9c3588).
>
> ==================================================================
> BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in smc_ioctl+0x5c5/0x7a0 net/smc/af_smc.c:1536
> Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000020 by task syz-executor0/5046
>
> CPU: 0 PID: 5046 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3 #1
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
> Call Trace:
> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
> dump_stack+0x18f/0x26c lib/dump_stack.c:113
> kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:352 [inline]
> kasan_report.cold.7+0x13b/0x2f5 mm/kasan/report.c:412
> check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
> __asan_load4+0x78/0x80 mm/kasan/kasan.c:698
> smc_ioctl+0x5c5/0x7a0 net/smc/af_smc.c:1536
> sock_do_ioctl+0xcc/0x380 net/socket.c:969
> sock_ioctl+0x2bd/0x5a0 net/socket.c:1093
> vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
> file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:500 [inline]
> do_vfs_ioctl+0x188/0xf80 fs/ioctl.c:684
> ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:701
> __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:708 [inline]
> __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:706 [inline]
> __x64_sys_ioctl+0x43/0x50 fs/ioctl.c:706
> do_syscall_64+0x182/0x540 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
> RIP: 0033:0x44b939
> Code: 8d 6b fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 5b 6b fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
> RSP: 002b:00007f6708050b48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000071bee0 RCX: 000000000044b939
> RDX: 0000000020000180 RSI: 0000000000008905 RDI: 0000000000000015
> RBP: 00000000000066a8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f67080516d4
> R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 00000000006f2748 R15: 0000000000000001
> ==================================================================
>
> = About RaceFuzzer
>
> RaceFuzzer is a customized version of Syzkaller, specifically tailored
> to find race condition bugs in the Linux kernel. While we leverage
> many different technique, the notable feature of RaceFuzzer is in
> leveraging a custom hypervisor (QEMU/KVM) to interleave the
> scheduling. In particular, we modified the hypervisor to intentionally
> stall a per-core execution, which is similar to supporting per-core
> breakpoint functionality. This allows RaceFuzzer to force the kernel
> to deterministically trigger racy condition (which may rarely happen
> in practice due to randomness in scheduling).
>
> RaceFuzzer's C repro always pinpoints two racy syscalls. Since C
> repro's scheduling synchronization should be performed at the user
> space, its reproducibility is limited (reproduction may take from 1
> second to 10 minutes (or even more), depending on a bug). This is
> because, while RaceFuzzer precisely interleaves the scheduling at the
> kernel's instruction level when finding this bug, C repro cannot fully
> utilize such a feature. Please disregard all code related to
> "should_hypercall" in the C repro, as this is only for our debugging
> purposes using our own hypervisor.
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