Date:   Tue, 17 Jul 2018 13:45:57 +0200
From:   Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@...hat.com>
To:     Jason Baron <jbaron@...mai.com>
Cc:     Roman Mohr <rmohr@...hat.com>, fdeutsch@...hat.com,
        libvir-list@...hat.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        ebiederm@...ssion.com, davem@...emloft.net,
        Laine Stump <laine@...ne.org>
Subject: Re: [libvirt] opening tap devices that are created in a container

[Not sure who got this message, but it probably didn't get anywhere due to one
 mailserver, so resending to make sure]

On Mon, Jul 09, 2018 at 05:00:49PM -0400, Jason Baron wrote:
>On 07/08/2018 02:01 AM, Martin Kletzander wrote:
>> On Thu, Jul 05, 2018 at 06:24:20PM +0200, Roman Mohr wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jul 5, 2018 at 4:20 PM Jason Baron <jbaron@...mai.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> Opening tap devices, such as macvtap, that are created in containers is
>>>> problematic because the interface for opening tap devices is via
>>>> /dev/tapNN and devtmpfs is not typically mounted inside a container as
>>>> its not namespace aware. It is possible to do a mknod() in the
>>>> container, once the tap devices are created, however, since the tap
>>>> devices are created dynamically its not possible to apriori allow access
>>>> to certain major/minor numbers, since we don't know what these are going
>>>> to be. In addition, its desirable to not allow the mknod capability in
>>>> containers. This behavior, I think is somewhat inconsistent with the
>>>> tuntap driver where one can create tuntap devices inside a container by
>>>> first opening /dev/net/tun and then using them by supplying the tuntap
>>>> device name via the ioctl(TUNSETIFF). And since TUNSETIFF validates the
>>>> network namespace, one is limited to opening network devices that belong
>>>> to your current network namespace.
>>>>
>>>> Here are some options to this issue, that I wanted to get feedback
>>>> about, and just wondering if anybody else has run into this.
>>>>
>>>> 1)
>>>>
>>>> Don't create the tap device, such as macvtap in the container. Instead,
>>>> create the tap device outside of the container and then move it into the
>>>> desired container network namespace. In addition, do a mknod() for the
>>>> corresponding /dev/tapNN device from outside the container before doing
>>>> chroot().
>>>>
>>>> This solution still doesn't allow tap devices to be created inside the
>>>> container. Thus, in the case of kubevirt, which runs libvirtd inside of
>>>> a container, it would mean changing libvirtd to open existing tap
>>>> devices (as opposed to the current behavior of creating new ones). This
>>>> would not require any kernel changes, but as mentioned seems
>>>> inconsistent with the tuntap interface.
>>>>
>>>
>>> For KubeVirt, apart from how exactly the device ends up in the
>>> container, I
>>> would want to pursue a way where all network preparations which require
>>> privileges happens from a privileged process *outside* of the container.
>>> Like CNI solutions do it. They run outside, have privileges and then
>>> create
>>> devices in the right network/mount namespace or move them there. The
>>> final
>>> goal for KubeVirt is that our pod with the qemu process is completely
>>> unprivileged and privileged setup happens from outside.
>>>
>>> As a consequence, and depending on which route Dan pursues with the
>>> restructured libvirt, I would assume that either a privileged
>>> libvirtd-part
>>> outside of containers creates the devices by entering the right
>>> namespaces,
>>> or that libvirt in the container can consume pre-created tun/tap devices,
>>> like qemu.
>>>
>>
>> That would be nice, but as far as I understand there will always be a
>> need for
>> some privileges if you want to use a tap device.  It's nice that CNI
>> does that
>> and all the containers can run unprivileged, but that's because they do
>> not open
>> the tap device and they do not do any privileged operations on it.  But
>> QEMU
>> needs to.  So the only way would be passing an opened fd to the
>> container or
>> opening the tap device there and making the fd usable for one process in
>> the
>> container.  Is this already supported for some type of containers in
>> some way?
>>
>> Martin
>
>Hi,
>
>So another option here call it #3 is to pass open fds via unix sockets.
>If there are privileged operations that QEMU is trying to do with the fd
>though, how will opening it first and then passing it to an unprivileged
>QEMU address that? Is the opener doing those operations first?
>

Sorry for the confusion, but QEMU is not doing any privileged operations.  I got
confused by the fact that anyone can open and do a R/W on a tap device.  But it
looks like that's on purpose.  No capabilities are needed for opening
/dev/net/tun and calling ioctl(TUNSETIFF) with existing name and then doing R/W
operations on it.  It just works.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but to sum it all up, the only things that we need to
figure out (which might possibly be solved by ideas in the other thread) are:

tap:
- Existence of /dev/net/tun
- Having permissions to open it (0666 by default, shouldn't be a nig deal)
- Knowing the device name

macvtap:
- Existence of /dev/tapXX
- Having permissions to open /dev/tapXX
- One of the following:
  - Knowing the device name (and being able to translate it using a netlink socket)
  - Knowing the the device index

The rest should be an implementation detail.

Am I right?  Did I miss anything?
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