netdev - Re: [PATCH net-next v3 1/5] tc/act: user space can't use TC_ACT

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Message-ID: <20180725130330.GJ2164@nanopsycho>
Date:   Wed, 25 Jul 2018 15:03:30 +0200
From:   Jiri Pirko <jiri@...nulli.us>
To:     Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
Cc:     Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@...atatu.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com>,
        Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@...il.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v3 1/5] tc/act: user space can't use
 TC_ACT_REDIRECT directly

Wed, Jul 25, 2018 at 02:54:04PM CEST, pabeni@...hat.com wrote:
>Hi,
>
>On Wed, 2018-07-25 at 13:56 +0200, Jiri Pirko wrote:
>> Tue, Jul 24, 2018 at 10:06:39PM CEST, pabeni@...hat.com wrote:
>> > Only cls_bpf and act_bpf can safely use such value. If a generic
>> > action is configured by user space to return TC_ACT_REDIRECT,
>> > the usually visible behavior is passing the skb up the stack - as
>> > for unknown action, but, with complex configuration, more random
>> > results can be obtained.
>> > 
>> > This patch forcefully converts TC_ACT_REDIRECT to TC_ACT_UNSPEC
>> > at action init time, making the kernel behavior more consistent.
>> > 
>> > v1 -> v3: use TC_ACT_UNSPEC instead of a newly definied act value
>> > 
>> > Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
>> > ---
>> > net/sched/act_api.c | 5 +++++
>> > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>> > 
>> > diff --git a/net/sched/act_api.c b/net/sched/act_api.c
>> > index 148a89ab789b..24b5534967fe 100644
>> > --- a/net/sched/act_api.c
>> > +++ b/net/sched/act_api.c
>> > @@ -895,6 +895,11 @@ struct tc_action *tcf_action_init_1(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp,
>> > 		}
>> > 	}
>> > 
>> > +	if (a->tcfa_action == TC_ACT_REDIRECT) {
>> > +		net_warn_ratelimited("TC_ACT_REDIRECT can't be used directly");
>> 
>> Can't you push this warning through extack?
>> 
>> But, wouldn't it be more appropriate to fail here? User is passing
>> invalid configuration....
>
>Jiri, Jamal, thank you for the feedback.
>
>Please allow me to answer both of you here, since you raised similar
>concers.
>
>I thought about rejecting the action, but that change of behavior could
>break some users, as currently most kind of invalid tcfa_action values
>are simply accepted.
>
>If there is consensus about it, I can simply fail.

Well it was obviously wrong to expose TC_ACT_REDIRECT to uapi and it
really has no meaning for anyone to use it throughout its whole history.
I would vote for "fail", yet I admit that I am usually alone in opinion
about similar uapi changes :)



>
>Thanks,
>
>Paolo
>