netdev - [PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V4 10/10] debug audit: read container ID of a process

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Message-Id: <dfe41da856b2ace574be9df3664cfdce9b47adf5.1533065887.git.rgb@redhat.com>
Date:   Tue, 31 Jul 2018 16:07:45 -0400
From:   Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
To:     containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@...hat.com>,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     luto@...nel.org, carlos@...hat.com, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
        dhowells@...hat.com, simo@...hat.com, eparis@...isplace.org,
        serge@...lyn.com, ebiederm@...ssion.com,
        Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V4 10/10] debug audit: read container ID of a process

Add support for reading the audit container identifier from the proc
filesystem.

This is a read from the proc entry of the form
/proc/PID/audit_containerid where PID is the process ID of the task
whose audit container identifier is sought.

The read expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).

This read requires CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
---
 fs/proc/base.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 1b3cda1..95fc64a 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1261,6 +1261,24 @@ static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
 	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
+static ssize_t proc_contid_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
+	ssize_t length;
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN*2];
+
+	if (!task)
+		return -ESRCH;
+	/* if we don't have caps, reject */
+	if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+		return -EPERM;
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN*2, "%llu", audit_get_contid(task));
+	put_task_struct(task);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
 static ssize_t proc_contid_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				   size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
@@ -1291,6 +1309,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_contid_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations proc_contid_operations = {
+	.read		= proc_contid_read,
 	.write		= proc_contid_write,
 	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
@@ -2987,7 +3006,7 @@ static int proc_pid_patch_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
 	REG("loginuid",   S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),
 	REG("sessionid",  S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations),
-	REG("audit_containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_contid_operations),
+	REG("audit_containerid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUSR, proc_contid_operations),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
 	REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
@@ -3373,7 +3392,7 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
 	REG("loginuid",  S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),
 	REG("sessionid",  S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations),
-	REG("audit_containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_contid_operations),
+	REG("audit_containerid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUSR, proc_contid_operations),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
 	REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
-- 
1.8.3.1