[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20180828155938.GF6515@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Date: Tue, 28 Aug 2018 16:59:38 +0100
From: Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
To: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@...atatu.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Jiri Pirko <jiri@...nulli.us>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
Linux Kernel Network Developers <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: sched: Fix memory exposure from short TCA_U32_SEL
On Tue, Aug 28, 2018 at 01:03:10AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> if (tcf_exts_get_net(&n->exts))
> tcf_queue_work(&n->rwork, u32_delete_key_freepf_work);
> else
> u32_destroy_key(n->tp, n, true);
> ... and we hit u32_destroy_key(<tp>, <knode>, true), which does
Speaking of which, we'd better never hit that branch for other reasons - there's
no RCU delay between removal of knode from the hash chain and its kfree().
tcf_queue_work() does guarantee such delay (by use of queue_rcu_work()), direct
call doesn't...
Anyway, whichever branch is taken, the memory corruption problem remains - the
comments below are accurate, AFAICS.
> Incidentally, if we hit
> tcf_queue_work(&n->rwork, u32_delete_key_freepf_work);
> instead of u32_destroy_key(), the things don't seem to be any better - we
> won't do anything to <knode> until rtnl is dropped, so u32_destroy() won't
> break on the second pass through the loop - it'll free <ht0> there and
> return. Setting us up for trouble, since when u32_delete_key_freepf_work()
> finally gets to u32_destroy_key() we'll have <knode>->ht_down pointing
> to freed memory and decrementing its contents...
Powered by blists - more mailing lists