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Date:   Sat, 15 Sep 2018 12:13:25 +0000
From:   Vakul Garg <vakul.garg@....com>
To:     John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
        "davejwatson@...com" <davejwatson@...com>
CC:     "doronrk@...com" <doronrk@...com>,
        "netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        "alexei.starovoitov@...il.com" <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
        "daniel@...earbox.net" <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        "davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: RE: [net-next PATCH] tls: async support causes out-of-bounds access
 in crypto APIs



> -----Original Message-----
> From: netdev-owner@...r.kernel.org <netdev-owner@...r.kernel.org> On
> Behalf Of John Fastabend
> Sent: Saturday, September 15, 2018 1:32 AM
> To: Vakul Garg <vakul.garg@....com>; davejwatson@...com
> Cc: doronrk@...com; netdev@...r.kernel.org;
> alexei.starovoitov@...il.com; daniel@...earbox.net;
> davem@...emloft.net
> Subject: [net-next PATCH] tls: async support causes out-of-bounds access in
> crypto APIs
> 
> When async support was added it needed to access the sk from the async
> callback to report errors up the stack. The patch tried to use space after the
> aead request struct by directly setting the reqsize field in aead_request. This
> is an internal field that should not be used outside the crypto APIs. It is used
> by the crypto code to define extra space for private structures used in the
> crypto context. Users of the API then use crypto_aead_reqsize() and add the
> returned amount of bytes to the end of the request memory allocation
> before posting the request to encrypt/decrypt APIs.
> 
> So this breaks (with general protection fault and KASAN error, if
> enabled) because the request sent to decrypt is shorter than required causing
> the crypto API out-of-bounds errors. Also it seems unlikely the sk is even valid
> by the time it gets to the callback because of memset in crypto layer.
> 
> Anyways, fix this by holding the sk in the skb->sk field when the callback is set
> up and because the skb is already passed through to the callback handler via
> void* we can access it in the handler. Then in the handler we need to be
> careful to NULL the pointer again before kfree_skb. I added comments on
> both the setup (in tls_do_decryption) and when we clear it from the crypto
> callback handler tls_decrypt_done(). After this selftests pass again and fixes
> KASAN errors/warnings.
> 
> Fixes: 94524d8fc965 ("net/tls: Add support for async decryption of tls
> records")
> Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>
> ---
>  include/net/tls.h |    4 ----
>  net/tls/tls_sw.c  |   39 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
>  2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/net/tls.h b/include/net/tls.h index cd0a65b..8630d28
> 100644
> --- a/include/net/tls.h
> +++ b/include/net/tls.h
> @@ -128,10 +128,6 @@ struct tls_sw_context_rx {
>  	bool async_notify;
>  };
> 
> -struct decrypt_req_ctx {
> -	struct sock *sk;
> -};
> -
>  struct tls_record_info {
>  	struct list_head list;
>  	u32 end_seq;
> diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index be4f2e9..cef69b6 100644
> --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
> +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
> @@ -122,25 +122,32 @@ static int skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset,
> int len)  static void tls_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int
> err)  {
>  	struct aead_request *aead_req = (struct aead_request *)req;
> -	struct decrypt_req_ctx *req_ctx =
> -			(struct decrypt_req_ctx *)(aead_req + 1);
> -
>  	struct scatterlist *sgout = aead_req->dst;
> -
> -	struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(req_ctx->sk);
> -	struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
> -	int pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
> +	struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx;
> +	struct tls_context *tls_ctx;
>  	struct scatterlist *sg;
> +	struct sk_buff *skb;
>  	unsigned int pages;
> +	int pending;
> +
> +	skb = (struct sk_buff *)req->data;
> +	tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(skb->sk);
> +	ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
> +	pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
> 
>  	/* Propagate if there was an err */
>  	if (err) {
>  		ctx->async_wait.err = err;
> -		tls_err_abort(req_ctx->sk, err);
> +		tls_err_abort(skb->sk, err);
>  	}
> 
> +	/* After using skb->sk to propagate sk through crypto async callback
> +	 * we need to NULL it again.
> +	 */
> +	skb->sk = NULL;
> +
>  	/* Release the skb, pages and memory allocated for crypto req */
> -	kfree_skb(req->data);
> +	kfree_skb(skb);
> 
>  	/* Skip the first S/G entry as it points to AAD */
>  	for_each_sg(sg_next(sgout), sg, UINT_MAX, pages) { @@ -175,11
> +182,13 @@ static int tls_do_decryption(struct sock *sk,
>  			       (u8 *)iv_recv);
> 
>  	if (async) {
> -		struct decrypt_req_ctx *req_ctx;
> -
> -		req_ctx = (struct decrypt_req_ctx *)(aead_req + 1);
> -		req_ctx->sk = sk;
> -
> +		/* Using skb->sk to push sk through to crypto async callback
> +		 * handler. This allows propagating errors up to the socket
> +		 * if needed. It _must_ be cleared in the async handler
> +		 * before kfree_skb is called. We _know_ skb->sk is NULL
> +		 * because it is a clone from strparser.
> +		 */
> +		skb->sk = sk;
>  		aead_request_set_callback(aead_req,
> 
> CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
>  					  tls_decrypt_done, skb);
> @@ -1455,8 +1464,6 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct
> tls_context *ctx, int tx)
>  		goto free_aead;
> 
>  	if (sw_ctx_rx) {
> -		(*aead)->reqsize = sizeof(struct decrypt_req_ctx);
> -
>  		/* Set up strparser */
>  		memset(&cb, 0, sizeof(cb));
>  		cb.rcv_msg = tls_queue;

Reviewed-by: Vakul Garg <Vakul.garg@....com>

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