netdev - Re: [PATCH net-next v2 01/10] net: allow binding socket in a VRF when there's an unbound socket

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Message-ID: <f6591922-07eb-2a33-747c-3ad118c52f68@gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 2 Oct 2018 13:39:09 -0600
From:   David Ahern <dsahern@...il.com>
To:     Mike Manning <mmanning@...tta.att-mail.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Robert Shearman <rshearma@...tta.att-mail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v2 01/10] net: allow binding socket in a VRF when
 there's an unbound socket

On 10/1/18 2:43 AM, Mike Manning wrote:
> There is no easy way currently for applications that want to receive
> packets in the default VRF to be isolated from packets arriving in
> VRFs, which makes using VRF-unaware applications in a VRF-aware system
> a potential security risk.

please drop that paragraph from the commit message. It is misleading and
wrong.

Without VRF I can start ssh bound to wildcard address and port 22
allowing connections across any interface in the box. If I do not want
that sestup, I have options: e.g., bind ssh to the management address or
install netfilter rules. The same applies with VRF as I mentioned in the
v1 review.

You not liking the options or wanting another option is a different
reason for the change than claiming the current options are a security risk.