[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <1539013777-1625-1-git-send-email-wang6495@umn.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Oct 2018 10:49:35 -0500
From: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@....edu>
To: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@....edu>
Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@....edu>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@...il.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andrew Lunn <andrew@...n.ch>,
Edward Cree <ecree@...arflare.com>,
Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@...lanox.com>,
Yury Norov <ynorov@...iumnetworks.com>,
Alan Brady <alan.brady@...el.com>,
Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org (open list:NETWORKING [GENERAL]),
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org (open list)
Subject: [PATCH] ethtool: fix a privilege escalation bug
In dev_ethtool(), the eth command 'ethcmd' is firstly copied from the
use-space buffer 'useraddr' and checked to see whether it is
ETHTOOL_PERQUEUE. If yes, the sub-command 'sub_cmd' is further copied from
the user space. Otherwise, 'sub_cmd' is the same as 'ethcmd'. Next,
according to 'sub_cmd', a permission check is enforced through the function
ns_capable(). For example, the permission check is required if 'sub_cmd' is
ETHTOOL_SCOALESCE, but it is not necessary if 'sub_cmd' is
ETHTOOL_GCOALESCE, as suggested in the comment "Allow some commands to be
done by anyone". The following execution invokes different handlers
according to 'ethcmd'. Specifically, if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_PERQUEUE,
ethtool_set_per_queue() is called. In ethtool_set_per_queue(), the kernel
object 'per_queue_opt' is copied again from the user-space buffer
'useraddr' and 'per_queue_opt.sub_command' is used to determine which
operation should be performed. Given that the buffer 'useraddr' is in the
user space, a malicious user can race to change the sub-command between the
two copies. In particular, the attacker can supply ETHTOOL_PERQUEUE and
ETHTOOL_GCOALESCE to bypass the permission check in dev_ethtool(). Then
before ethtool_set_per_queue() is called, the attacker changes
ETHTOOL_GCOALESCE to ETHTOOL_SCOALESCE. In this way, the attacker can
bypass the permission check and execute ETHTOOL_SCOALESCE.
This patch enforces a check in ethtool_set_per_queue() after the second
copy from 'useraddr'. If the sub-command is different from the one obtained
in the first copy in dev_ethtool(), an error code EINVAL will be returned.
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@....edu>
---
net/core/ethtool.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/ethtool.c b/net/core/ethtool.c
index c9993c6..ccb337e 100644
--- a/net/core/ethtool.c
+++ b/net/core/ethtool.c
@@ -2462,13 +2462,17 @@ static int ethtool_set_per_queue_coalesce(struct net_device *dev,
return ret;
}
-static int ethtool_set_per_queue(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr)
+static int ethtool_set_per_queue(struct net_device *dev,
+ void __user *useraddr, u32 sub_cmd)
{
struct ethtool_per_queue_op per_queue_opt;
if (copy_from_user(&per_queue_opt, useraddr, sizeof(per_queue_opt)))
return -EFAULT;
+ if (per_queue_opt.sub_command != sub_cmd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
switch (per_queue_opt.sub_command) {
case ETHTOOL_GCOALESCE:
return ethtool_get_per_queue_coalesce(dev, useraddr, &per_queue_opt);
@@ -2838,7 +2842,7 @@ int dev_ethtool(struct net *net, struct ifreq *ifr)
rc = ethtool_get_phy_stats(dev, useraddr);
break;
case ETHTOOL_PERQUEUE:
- rc = ethtool_set_per_queue(dev, useraddr);
+ rc = ethtool_set_per_queue(dev, useraddr, sub_cmd);
break;
case ETHTOOL_GLINKSETTINGS:
rc = ethtool_get_link_ksettings(dev, useraddr);
--
2.7.4
Powered by blists - more mailing lists