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Message-ID: <20181017172636.57adi6yv7znuaqg5@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com>
Date:   Wed, 17 Oct 2018 10:26:38 -0700
From:   Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To:     Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>
Cc:     netdev@...r.kernel.org, ast@...nel.org, daniel@...earbox.net,
        kernel-team@...com
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf: add cg_skb_is_valid_access for
 BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB

On Tue, Oct 16, 2018 at 10:56:05PM -0700, Song Liu wrote:
> BPF programs of BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB need to access headers in the
> skb. This patch enables direct access of skb for these programs.

The lack of direct packet access in CGROUP_SKB progs was
an unpleasant surprise to me, so thank you for fixing it,
but there are few issues with the patch. See below.

> In __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_skb(), bpf_compute_data_pointers() is called
> to compute proper data_end for the BPF program.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>
> ---
>  kernel/bpf/cgroup.c |  4 ++++
>  net/core/filter.c   | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
> index 00f6ed2e4f9a..340d496f35bd 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
> @@ -566,6 +566,10 @@ int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_skb(struct sock *sk,
>  	save_sk = skb->sk;
>  	skb->sk = sk;
>  	__skb_push(skb, offset);
> +
> +	/* compute pointers for the bpf prog */
> +	bpf_compute_data_pointers(skb);
> +
>  	ret = BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY(cgrp->bpf.effective[type], skb,
>  				 bpf_prog_run_save_cb);
>  	__skb_pull(skb, offset);
> diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
> index 1a3ac6c46873..8b5a502e241f 100644
> --- a/net/core/filter.c
> +++ b/net/core/filter.c
> @@ -5346,6 +5346,30 @@ static bool sk_filter_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
>  	return bpf_skb_is_valid_access(off, size, type, prog, info);
>  }
>  
> +static bool cg_skb_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
> +				   enum bpf_access_type type,
> +				   const struct bpf_prog *prog,
> +				   struct bpf_insn_access_aux *info)
> +{
> +	if (type == BPF_WRITE)
> +		return false;

this disables writes into cb[0..4] that were allowed for cgroup_inet_* before.
One can argue that this may break existing progs,
but looking at the place where BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_INGRESS is called
it seems it's actually not correct in all cases to access cb there.
Just few lines down we call bpf_prog_run_save_cb() which save/restores
these 24 bytes.
So we have two option either add save/restore for INET_INGRESS only
or disable read and write access to cb[0..4] for CGROUP_SKB progs.
I prefer the former.

> +
> +	switch (off) {
> +	case bpf_ctx_range(struct __sk_buff, len):
> +		break;
> +	case bpf_ctx_range(struct __sk_buff, data):
> +		info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET;
> +		break;
> +	case bpf_ctx_range(struct __sk_buff, data_end):
> +		info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET_END;
> +		break;
> +	default:
> +		return false;
> +	}

this also enables access to a range of fields family..local_port.
It's ok to do for egress, but not for ingress unless we
add code similar to the bottom of sk_filter_trim_cap() that
inits skb->sk.

above change also allows access to data_meta and flow_keys
which is not correct.

Considering all that I'm proposing to fix INET_INGRESS call site
similar to code below it in sk_filter_trim_cap().
In particular to do:
struct sock *save_sk = skb->sk;
skb->sk = sk;
save and clear cb
BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_INGRESS
restore cb
skb->sk = save_sk;

all of above can probaby be inside BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_INGRESS macro.
Then in this cg_skb_is_valid_access() allow access to data/data_end
and family..local_port range as well.
while disallowing access to flow_keys and data_meta.

In patch 2 we gotta have tests for all these fields.

Thoughts?

> +
> +	return bpf_skb_is_valid_access(off, size, type, prog, info);
> +}
> +
>  static bool lwt_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
>  				enum bpf_access_type type,
>  				const struct bpf_prog *prog,
> @@ -7038,7 +7062,7 @@ const struct bpf_prog_ops xdp_prog_ops = {
>  
>  const struct bpf_verifier_ops cg_skb_verifier_ops = {
>  	.get_func_proto		= cg_skb_func_proto,
> -	.is_valid_access	= sk_filter_is_valid_access,
> +	.is_valid_access	= cg_skb_is_valid_access,
>  	.convert_ctx_access	= bpf_convert_ctx_access,
>  };
>  
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 

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