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Message-ID: <11ee5374-2df6-1d73-2d99-932b6117ccea@redhat.com>
Date:   Mon, 29 Oct 2018 10:54:19 +0800
From:   Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
To:     Jianfeng Tan <jianfeng.tan@...ux.alibaba.com>,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     davem@...emloft.net, mst@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net/packet: support vhost mrg_rxbuf


On 2018/10/27 下午8:04, Jianfeng Tan wrote:
> Previouly, virtio net header size is hardcoded to be 10, which makes
> the feature mrg_rxbuf not available.
>
> We redefine PACKET_VNET_HDR ioctl which treats user input as boolean,
> but now as int, 0, 10, 12, or everything else be treated as 10.
>
> There will be one case which is treated differently: if user input is
> 12, previously, the header size will be 10; but now it's 12.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jianfeng Tan <jianfeng.tan@...ux.alibaba.com>


This should go for net-next which is closed. You may consider to 
re-submit when it was open.


> ---
>   net/packet/af_packet.c | 97 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
>   net/packet/diag.c      |  2 +-
>   net/packet/internal.h  |  2 +-
>   3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
> index ec3095f13aae..1bd7f4cdcc80 100644
> --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
> +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
> @@ -1999,18 +1999,24 @@ static unsigned int run_filter(struct sk_buff *skb,
>   }
>   
>   static int packet_rcv_vnet(struct msghdr *msg, const struct sk_buff *skb,
> -			   size_t *len)
> +			   size_t *len, int vnet_hdr_len)
>   {
> +	int res;
>   	struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr;
>   
> -	if (*len < sizeof(vnet_hdr))
> +	if (*len < vnet_hdr_len)
>   		return -EINVAL;
> -	*len -= sizeof(vnet_hdr);
> +	*len -= vnet_hdr_len;
>   
>   	if (virtio_net_hdr_from_skb(skb, &vnet_hdr, vio_le(), true, 0))
>   		return -EINVAL;
>   
> -	return memcpy_to_msg(msg, (void *)&vnet_hdr, sizeof(vnet_hdr));
> +	res = memcpy_to_msg(msg, (void *)&vnet_hdr, sizeof(vnet_hdr));
> +	if (res == 0)
> +		iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter,
> +				 vnet_hdr_len - sizeof(vnet_hdr));
> +
> +	return res;
>   }
>   
>   /*
> @@ -2206,11 +2212,13 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
>   				  po->tp_reserve;
>   	} else {
>   		unsigned int maclen = skb_network_offset(skb);
> +		int vnet_hdr_sz = READ_ONCE(po->vnet_hdr_sz);
> +
>   		netoff = TPACKET_ALIGN(po->tp_hdrlen +
>   				       (maclen < 16 ? 16 : maclen)) +
>   				       po->tp_reserve;
> -		if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
> -			netoff += sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
> +		if (vnet_hdr_sz) {
> +			netoff += vnet_hdr_sz;
>   			do_vnet = true;
>   		}
>   		macoff = netoff - maclen;
> @@ -2429,19 +2437,6 @@ static int __packet_snd_vnet_parse(struct virtio_net_hdr *vnet_hdr, size_t len)
>   	return 0;
>   }
>   
> -static int packet_snd_vnet_parse(struct msghdr *msg, size_t *len,
> -				 struct virtio_net_hdr *vnet_hdr)
> -{
> -	if (*len < sizeof(*vnet_hdr))
> -		return -EINVAL;
> -	*len -= sizeof(*vnet_hdr);
> -
> -	if (!copy_from_iter_full(vnet_hdr, sizeof(*vnet_hdr), &msg->msg_iter))
> -		return -EFAULT;
> -
> -	return __packet_snd_vnet_parse(vnet_hdr, *len);
> -}
> -
>   static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
>   		void *frame, struct net_device *dev, void *data, int tp_len,
>   		__be16 proto, unsigned char *addr, int hlen, int copylen,
> @@ -2609,6 +2604,7 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
>   	int len_sum = 0;
>   	int status = TP_STATUS_AVAILABLE;
>   	int hlen, tlen, copylen = 0;
> +	int vnet_hdr_sz;
>   
>   	mutex_lock(&po->pg_vec_lock);
>   
> @@ -2648,7 +2644,8 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
>   	size_max = po->tx_ring.frame_size
>   		- (po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll));
>   
> -	if ((size_max > dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN) && !po->has_vnet_hdr)
> +	vnet_hdr_sz = READ_ONCE(po->vnet_hdr_sz);
> +	if ((size_max > dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN) && !vnet_hdr_sz)
>   		size_max = dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN;
>   
>   	do {
> @@ -2668,10 +2665,10 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
>   		status = TP_STATUS_SEND_REQUEST;
>   		hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev);
>   		tlen = dev->needed_tailroom;
> -		if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
> +		if (vnet_hdr_sz) {
>   			vnet_hdr = data;
> -			data += sizeof(*vnet_hdr);
> -			tp_len -= sizeof(*vnet_hdr);
> +			data += vnet_hdr_sz;
> +			tp_len -= vnet_hdr_sz;
>   			if (tp_len < 0 ||
>   			    __packet_snd_vnet_parse(vnet_hdr, tp_len)) {
>   				tp_len = -EINVAL;
> @@ -2696,7 +2693,7 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
>   					  addr, hlen, copylen, &sockc);
>   		if (likely(tp_len >= 0) &&
>   		    tp_len > dev->mtu + reserve &&
> -		    !po->has_vnet_hdr &&
> +		    !vnet_hdr_sz &&
>   		    !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb))
>   			tp_len = -EMSGSIZE;
>   
> @@ -2715,7 +2712,7 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
>   			}
>   		}
>   
> -		if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
> +		if (vnet_hdr_sz) {
>   			if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(skb, vnet_hdr, vio_le())) {
>   				tp_len = -EINVAL;
>   				goto tpacket_error;
> @@ -2802,9 +2799,9 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
>   	int err, reserve = 0;
>   	struct sockcm_cookie sockc;
>   	struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr = { 0 };
> +	int vnet_hdr_sz;
>   	int offset = 0;
>   	struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
> -	bool has_vnet_hdr = false;
>   	int hlen, tlen, linear;
>   	int extra_len = 0;
>   
> @@ -2844,11 +2841,29 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
>   
>   	if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW)
>   		reserve = dev->hard_header_len;
> -	if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
> -		err = packet_snd_vnet_parse(msg, &len, &vnet_hdr);
> -		if (err)
> +
> +	vnet_hdr_sz = READ_ONCE(po->vnet_hdr_sz);
> +	if (vnet_hdr_sz) {
> +		if (len < vnet_hdr_sz) {
> +			err = -EINVAL;
>   			goto out_unlock;
> -		has_vnet_hdr = true;
> +		}
> +		len -= vnet_hdr_sz;
> +
> +		if (!copy_from_iter_full(&vnet_hdr, sizeof(vnet_hdr),
> +					 &msg->msg_iter)) {
> +			err = -EFAULT;
> +			goto out_unlock;
> +		}
> +
> +		if (__packet_snd_vnet_parse(&vnet_hdr, len)) {
> +			err = -EINVAL;
> +			goto out_unlock;
> +		}


Any reason to open code packet_snd_vnet_parse() here?


> +
> +		/* TODO: check hdr_len with len? */
> +
> +		iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, vnet_hdr_sz - sizeof(vnet_hdr));
>   	}
>   
>   	if (unlikely(sock_flag(sk, SOCK_NOFCS))) {
> @@ -2912,7 +2927,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
>   	skb->mark = sockc.mark;
>   	skb->tstamp = sockc.transmit_time;
>   
> -	if (has_vnet_hdr) {
> +	if (vnet_hdr_sz) {
>   		err = virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(skb, &vnet_hdr, vio_le());
>   		if (err)
>   			goto out_free;
> @@ -3307,11 +3322,11 @@ static int packet_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
>   	if (pkt_sk(sk)->pressure)
>   		packet_rcv_has_room(pkt_sk(sk), NULL);
>   
> -	if (pkt_sk(sk)->has_vnet_hdr) {
> -		err = packet_rcv_vnet(msg, skb, &len);
> +	vnet_hdr_len = READ_ONCE(pkt_sk(sk)->vnet_hdr_sz);
> +	if (vnet_hdr_len) {
> +		err = packet_rcv_vnet(msg, skb, &len, vnet_hdr_len);
>   		if (err)
>   			goto out_free;
> -		vnet_hdr_len = sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
>   	}
>   
>   	/* You lose any data beyond the buffer you gave. If it worries
> @@ -3772,7 +3787,17 @@ packet_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optv
>   		if (po->rx_ring.pg_vec || po->tx_ring.pg_vec) {
>   			ret = -EBUSY;
>   		} else {
> -			po->has_vnet_hdr = !!val;
> +			/* Previouly we treat user input as boolean (!!val),
> +			 * now we treat it as int. After the below correction,
> +			 * the only violation case is 12, which results in
> +			 * vnet header size of 12 instead of 10.
> +			 */
> +			if (val &&
> +			    val != sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr) &&
> +			    val != sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr_mrg_rxbuf))
> +				val = sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
> +
> +			po->vnet_hdr_sz = val;
>   			ret = 0;
>   		}
>   		release_sock(sk);
> @@ -3903,7 +3928,7 @@ static int packet_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
>   		val = po->origdev;
>   		break;
>   	case PACKET_VNET_HDR:
> -		val = po->has_vnet_hdr;
> +		val = po->vnet_hdr_sz;


So the change here is noticeable by userspace. Maybe we need a new opt 
for this?

Thanks


>   		break;
>   	case PACKET_VERSION:
>   		val = po->tp_version;
> diff --git a/net/packet/diag.c b/net/packet/diag.c
> index 7ef1c881ae74..950015b6704f 100644
> --- a/net/packet/diag.c
> +++ b/net/packet/diag.c
> @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static int pdiag_put_info(const struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *nlskb)
>   		pinfo.pdi_flags |= PDI_AUXDATA;
>   	if (po->origdev)
>   		pinfo.pdi_flags |= PDI_ORIGDEV;
> -	if (po->has_vnet_hdr)
> +	if (po->vnet_hdr_sz)
>   		pinfo.pdi_flags |= PDI_VNETHDR;
>   	if (po->tp_loss)
>   		pinfo.pdi_flags |= PDI_LOSS;
> diff --git a/net/packet/internal.h b/net/packet/internal.h
> index 3bb7c5fb3bff..11bc75950f28 100644
> --- a/net/packet/internal.h
> +++ b/net/packet/internal.h
> @@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ struct packet_sock {
>   	unsigned int		running;	/* bind_lock must be held */
>   	unsigned int		auxdata:1,	/* writer must hold sock lock */
>   				origdev:1,
> -				has_vnet_hdr:1,
>   				tp_loss:1,
>   				tp_tx_has_off:1;
> +	int			vnet_hdr_sz;
>   	int			pressure;
>   	int			ifindex;	/* bound device		*/
>   	__be16			num;

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