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Message-Id: <20181030061049.7424-1-jasowang@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2018 14:10:49 +0800
From: Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
To: mst@...hat.com, jasowang@...hat.com
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH net] vhost: Fix Spectre V1 vulnerability
The idx in vhost_vring_ioctl() was controlled by userspace, hence a
potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
Fixing this by sanitizing idx before using it to index d->vqs.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@...hat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
---
drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
index f52008bb8df7..3a5f81a66d34 100644
--- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/interval_tree_generic.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "vhost.h"
@@ -1387,6 +1388,7 @@ long vhost_vring_ioctl(struct vhost_dev *d, unsigned int ioctl, void __user *arg
if (idx >= d->nvqs)
return -ENOBUFS;
+ idx = array_index_nospec(idx, d->nvqs);
vq = d->vqs[idx];
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
--
2.17.1
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