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Message-Id: <20181210193512.20463-1-jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Date:   Mon, 10 Dec 2018 11:35:12 -0800
From:   Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@...ronome.com>
To:     alexei.starovoitov@...il.com, daniel@...earbox.net
Cc:     oss-drivers@...ronome.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@...ronome.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf] bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences

Currently for liveness and state pruning the register parentage
chains don't include states of the callee.  This makes some sense
as the callee can't access those registers.  However, this means
that READs done after the callee returns will not propagate into
the states of the callee.  Callee will then perform pruning
disregarding differences in caller state.

Example:

   0: (85) call bpf_user_rnd_u32
   1: (b7) r8 = 0
   2: (55) if r0 != 0x0 goto pc+1
   3: (b7) r8 = 1
   4: (bf) r1 = r8
   5: (85) call pc+4
   6: (15) if r8 == 0x1 goto pc+1
   7: (05) *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r3
   8: (b7) r0 = 0
   9: (95) exit

   10: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+0
   11: (95) exit

Here we acquire unknown state with call to get_random() [1].  Then
we store this random state in r8 (either 0 or 1) [1 - 3], and make
a call on line 5.  Callee does nothing but a trivial conditional
jump (to create a pruning point).  Upon return caller checks the
state of r8 and either performs an unsafe read or not.

Verifier will first explore the path with r8 == 1, creating a pruning
point at [11].  The parentage chain for r8 will include only callers
states so once verifier reaches [6] it will mark liveness only on states
in the caller, and not [11].  Now when verifier walks the paths with
r8 == 0 it will reach [11] and since REG_LIVE_READ on r8 was not
propagated there it will prune the walk entirely (stop walking
the entire program, not just the callee).  Since [6] was never walked
with r8 == 0, [7] will be considered dead and replaced with "goto -1"
causing hang at runtime.

This patch weaves the callee's explored states onto the callers
parentage chain.

v1: don't unnecessarily link caller saved regs (Jiong)

Fixes: f4d7e40a5b71 ("bpf: introduce function calls (verification)")
Reported-by: David Beckett <david.beckett@...ronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@...ronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@...ronome.com>
---
resend with netdev included
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                       | 10 +++++++-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index fc760d00a38c..60d57d9d3663 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -5114,11 +5114,19 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++)
 		cur->frame[cur->curframe]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
 
-	/* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */
+	/* connect new state to parentage chain:
+	 *  - all stack frames are accessible from callee
+	 *  - even though other stack frames' registers are not accessible
+	 *    liveness must propagate through the callees' states otherwise
+	 *    not knowing the liveness callee may prune caller
+	 */
 	for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) {
 		struct bpf_func_state *frame = cur->frame[j];
 		struct bpf_func_state *newframe = new->frame[j];
 
+		for (i = BPF_REG_6; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++)
+			frame->regs[i].parent = &newframe->regs[i];
+
 		for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
 			frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
 			frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.parent =
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
index df6f751cc1e8..373611ae9f52 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -13915,6 +13915,34 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 		.result = ACCEPT,
 	},
+	{
+		"calls: cross frame pruning",
+		.insns = {
+			/* r8 = !!random();
+			 * call pruner()
+			 * if (r8)
+			 *     do something bad;
+			 */
+			BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0,
+				     BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
+			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_8, 0),
+			BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
+			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_8, 1),
+			BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_8),
+			BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 1, 0, 4),
+			BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_8, 1, 1),
+			BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_1, 0),
+			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+			BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 0, 0),
+			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+		},
+		.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER,
+		.errstr_unpriv = "function calls to other bpf functions are allowed for root only",
+		.result_unpriv = REJECT,
+		.errstr = "!read_ok",
+		.result = REJECT,
+	},
 };
 
 static int probe_filter_length(const struct bpf_insn *fp)
-- 
2.17.1

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