[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-id: <20181217225942.GB41383@MacBook-Pro-19.local>
Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2018 14:59:42 -0800
From: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@...le.com>
To: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@...gle.com>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 2/5] tcp: TFO: search for correct cookie and
accept data
On 16/12/18 - 22:30:51, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>
>
> On 12/14/2018 02:40 PM, Christoph Paasch wrote:
> > This change allows to search for the right cookie and accepts old ones
> > (announcing a new one if it has changed).
> >
> > __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen_with_ctx() allows to generate a cookie based
> > on a given TFO-context. A later patch will cleanup the duplicate code.
>
> How long is kept the secondary (old) context ?
There is no time-limit on keeping the older context.
In an older version of this series I had the pool-size as a sysctl so one
could try out different configurations. For us, a size of 2 was good enough.
I could bring that back if you think it's useful.
> I do not know exact crypto_cipher_encrypt_one() cost, but it looks like
> your patch could double the cost of some TFO based attacks ?
True, we are doing more crypto if we are getting a lot of invalid or old cookies.
I don't have a good answer to that besides that one should probably disable
TFO at that point ;-)
On the other hand, AFAICS tcp_conn_request will end up setting want_cookie
to true under SYN-flooding so we won't even enter tcp_try_fastopen if it's
really an attack.
Christoph
Powered by blists - more mailing lists