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Message-Id: <20181218161527.2760-7-fw@strlen.de>
Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 17:15:20 +0100
From: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
To: <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
Subject: [PATCH net-next v2 06/13] net: use skb_sec_path helper in more places
skb_sec_path gains 'const' qualifier to avoid
xt_policy.c: 'skb_sec_path' discards 'const' qualifier from pointer target type
same reasoning as previous conversions: Won't need to touch these
spots anymore when skb->sp is removed.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
---
v2: no changes
include/linux/skbuff.h | 2 +-
include/net/xfrm.h | 6 ++++--
net/ipv4/esp4.c | 9 ++++++---
net/ipv4/esp4_offload.c | 4 +++-
net/ipv6/esp6.c | 9 ++++++---
net/ipv6/esp6_offload.c | 4 +++-
net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/xt_policy.c | 2 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c | 4 +++-
net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 16 ++++++++++------
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 19 +++++++++++--------
security/selinux/xfrm.c | 4 ++--
13 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h
index 70ac58240ec0..d0f254a016bf 100644
--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
+++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
@@ -4124,7 +4124,7 @@ static inline bool skb_get_dst_pending_confirm(const struct sk_buff *skb)
return skb->dst_pending_confirm != 0;
}
-static inline struct sec_path *skb_sec_path(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static inline struct sec_path *skb_sec_path(const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
return skb->sp;
diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index 4e1d074dc69e..71411ebaf765 100644
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -1893,14 +1893,16 @@ static inline void xfrm_states_delete(struct xfrm_state **states, int n)
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
static inline struct xfrm_state *xfrm_input_state(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return skb->sp->xvec[skb->sp->len - 1];
+ struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+
+ return sp->xvec[sp->len - 1];
}
#endif
static inline struct xfrm_offload *xfrm_offload(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
- struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
+ struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
if (!sp || !sp->olen || sp->len != sp->olen)
return NULL;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/esp4.c b/net/ipv4/esp4.c
index 9e1c840596c5..5459f41fc26f 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/esp4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/esp4.c
@@ -125,10 +125,13 @@ static void esp_output_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
void *tmp;
struct xfrm_state *x;
- if (xo && (xo->flags & XFRM_DEV_RESUME))
- x = skb->sp->xvec[skb->sp->len - 1];
- else
+ if (xo && (xo->flags & XFRM_DEV_RESUME)) {
+ struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+
+ x = sp->xvec[sp->len - 1];
+ } else {
x = skb_dst(skb)->xfrm;
+ }
tmp = ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp;
esp_ssg_unref(x, tmp);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/esp4_offload.c b/net/ipv4/esp4_offload.c
index 19bd22aa05f9..8756e0e790d2 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/esp4_offload.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/esp4_offload.c
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *esp4_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct crypto_aead *aead;
netdev_features_t esp_features = features;
struct xfrm_offload *xo = xfrm_offload(skb);
+ struct sec_path *sp;
if (!xo)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
@@ -122,7 +123,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *esp4_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (!(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_ESP))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- x = skb->sp->xvec[skb->sp->len - 1];
+ sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+ x = sp->xvec[sp->len - 1];
aead = x->data;
esph = ip_esp_hdr(skb);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
index 63b2b66f9dfa..5afe9f83374d 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
@@ -145,10 +145,13 @@ static void esp_output_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
void *tmp;
struct xfrm_state *x;
- if (xo && (xo->flags & XFRM_DEV_RESUME))
- x = skb->sp->xvec[skb->sp->len - 1];
- else
+ if (xo && (xo->flags & XFRM_DEV_RESUME)) {
+ struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+
+ x = sp->xvec[sp->len - 1];
+ } else {
x = skb_dst(skb)->xfrm;
+ }
tmp = ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp;
esp_ssg_unref(x, tmp);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6_offload.c b/net/ipv6/esp6_offload.c
index 01a97f5dfa4e..d46b4eb645c2 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/esp6_offload.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/esp6_offload.c
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *esp6_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct crypto_aead *aead;
netdev_features_t esp_features = features;
struct xfrm_offload *xo = xfrm_offload(skb);
+ struct sec_path *sp;
if (!xo)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
@@ -149,7 +150,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *esp6_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (!(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_ESP))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- x = skb->sp->xvec[skb->sp->len - 1];
+ sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+ x = sp->xvec[sp->len - 1];
aead = x->data;
esph = ip_esp_hdr(skb);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c
index 97c69df1b329..a52cb3fc6df5 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ int xfrm6_input_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, xfrm_address_t *daddr,
goto drop;
}
- skb->sp->xvec[skb->sp->len++] = x;
+ sp->xvec[sp->len++] = x;
spin_lock(&x->lock);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c b/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c
index 5322609f7662..b08865ec5ed3 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static void nft_xfrm_get_eval_in(const struct nft_xfrm *priv,
struct nft_regs *regs,
const struct nft_pktinfo *pkt)
{
- const struct sec_path *sp = pkt->skb->sp;
+ const struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(pkt->skb);
const struct xfrm_state *state;
if (sp == NULL || sp->len <= priv->spnum) {
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_policy.c b/net/netfilter/xt_policy.c
index 13f8ccf946d6..aa84e8121c93 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_policy.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_policy.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ match_policy_in(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_policy_info *info,
unsigned short family)
{
const struct xt_policy_elem *e;
- const struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
+ const struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
int strict = info->flags & XT_POLICY_MATCH_STRICT;
int i, pos;
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c
index 144c137886b1..b8736f56e7f7 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ struct sk_buff *validate_xmit_xfrm(struct sk_buff *skb, netdev_features_t featur
struct softnet_data *sd;
netdev_features_t esp_features = features;
struct xfrm_offload *xo = xfrm_offload(skb);
+ struct sec_path *sp;
if (!xo)
return skb;
@@ -39,7 +40,8 @@ struct sk_buff *validate_xmit_xfrm(struct sk_buff *skb, netdev_features_t featur
if (!(features & NETIF_F_HW_ESP))
esp_features = features & ~(NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_CSUM_MASK);
- x = skb->sp->xvec[skb->sp->len - 1];
+ sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+ x = sp->xvec[sp->len - 1];
if (xo->flags & XFRM_GRO || x->xso.flags & XFRM_OFFLOAD_INBOUND)
return skb;
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
index bda929b9ff35..b4db25b244fa 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
@@ -330,7 +330,9 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
daddr = (xfrm_address_t *)(skb_network_header(skb) +
XFRM_SPI_SKB_CB(skb)->daddroff);
do {
- if (skb->sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) {
+ sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+
+ if (sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) {
secpath_reset(skb);
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINBUFFERERROR);
goto drop;
@@ -346,7 +348,7 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
skb->mark = xfrm_smark_get(skb->mark, x);
- skb->sp->xvec[skb->sp->len++] = x;
+ sp->xvec[sp->len++] = x;
lock:
spin_lock(&x->lock);
@@ -470,8 +472,9 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
nf_reset(skb);
if (decaps) {
- if (skb->sp)
- skb->sp->olen = 0;
+ sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+ if (sp)
+ sp->olen = 0;
skb_dst_drop(skb);
gro_cells_receive(&gro_cells, skb);
return 0;
@@ -482,8 +485,9 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
err = x->inner_mode->afinfo->transport_finish(skb, xfrm_gro || async);
if (xfrm_gro) {
- if (skb->sp)
- skb->sp->olen = 0;
+ sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+ if (sp)
+ sp->olen = 0;
skb_dst_drop(skb);
gro_cells_receive(&gro_cells, skb);
return err;
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index 119a427d9b2b..49bc8d69ee87 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -2225,11 +2225,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_lookup_route);
static inline int
xfrm_secpath_reject(int idx, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct flowi *fl)
{
+ struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
struct xfrm_state *x;
- if (!skb->sp || idx < 0 || idx >= skb->sp->len)
+ if (!sp || idx < 0 || idx >= sp->len)
return 0;
- x = skb->sp->xvec[idx];
+ x = sp->xvec[idx];
if (!x->type->reject)
return 0;
return x->type->reject(x, skb, fl);
@@ -2329,6 +2330,7 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct flowi fl;
int xerr_idx = -1;
const struct xfrm_if_cb *ifcb;
+ struct sec_path *sp;
struct xfrm_if *xi;
u32 if_id = 0;
@@ -2353,11 +2355,12 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
nf_nat_decode_session(skb, &fl, family);
/* First, check used SA against their selectors. */
- if (skb->sp) {
+ sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+ if (sp) {
int i;
- for (i = skb->sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
- struct xfrm_state *x = skb->sp->xvec[i];
+ for (i = sp->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
if (!xfrm_selector_match(&x->sel, &fl, family)) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEMISMATCH);
return 0;
@@ -2384,7 +2387,7 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
}
if (!pol) {
- if (skb->sp && secpath_has_nontransport(skb->sp, 0, &xerr_idx)) {
+ if (sp && secpath_has_nontransport(sp, 0, &xerr_idx)) {
xfrm_secpath_reject(xerr_idx, skb, &fl);
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINNOPOLS);
return 0;
@@ -2413,7 +2416,6 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
#endif
if (pol->action == XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW) {
- struct sec_path *sp;
static struct sec_path dummy;
struct xfrm_tmpl *tp[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
struct xfrm_tmpl *stp[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
@@ -2421,7 +2423,8 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
int ti = 0;
int i, k;
- if ((sp = skb->sp) == NULL)
+ sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
+ if (!sp)
sp = &dummy;
for (pi = 0; pi < npols; pi++) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 91dc3783ed94..bd7d18bdb147 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 *sid, int ckall)
{
u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL;
- struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
+ struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
if (sp) {
int i;
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
int i;
- struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
+ struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
if (sp) {
--
2.19.2
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