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Date:   Mon, 24 Dec 2018 16:32:39 +0800
From:   Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
To:     "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
Cc:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 0/3] vhost: accelerate metadata access through
 vmap()


On 2018/12/14 下午8:33, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 11:42:18AM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
>> On 2018/12/13 下午11:27, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
>>> On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 06:10:19PM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
>>>> Hi:
>>>>
>>>> This series tries to access virtqueue metadata through kernel virtual
>>>> address instead of copy_user() friends since they had too much
>>>> overheads like checks, spec barriers or even hardware feature
>>>> toggling.
>>> Userspace accesses through remapping tricks and next time there's a need
>>> for a new barrier we are left to figure it out by ourselves.
>>
>> I don't get here, do you mean spec barriers?
> I mean the next barrier people decide to put into userspace
> memory accesses.
>
>> It's completely unnecessary for
>> vhost which is kernel thread.
> It's defence in depth. Take a look at the commit that added them.
> And yes quite possibly in most cases we actually have a spec
> barrier in the validation phase. If we do let's use the
> unsafe variants so they can be found.


unsafe variants can only work if you can batch userspace access. This is 
not necessarily the case for light load.


>
>> And even if you're right, vhost is not the
>> only place, there's lots of vmap() based accessing in kernel.
> For sure. But if one can get by without get user pages, one
> really should. Witness recently uncovered mess with file
> backed storage.


We only pin metadata pages, I don't believe they will be used by any DMA.


>
>> Think in
>> another direction, this means we won't suffer form unnecessary barriers for
>> kthread like vhost in the future, we will manually pick the one we really
>> need
> I personally think we should err on the side of caution not on the side of
> performance.


So what you suggest may lead unnecessary performance regression 
(10%-20%) which is part of the goal of this series. We should audit and 
only use the one we really need instead of depending on copy_user() 
friends().

If we do it our own, it could be slow for for security fix but it's no 
less safe than before with performance kept.


>
>> (but it should have little possibility).
> History seems to teach otherwise.


What case did you mean here?


>
>> Please notice we only access metdata through remapping not the data itself.
>> This idea has been used for high speed userspace backend for years, e.g
>> packet socket or recent AF_XDP.
> I think their justification for the higher risk is that they are mostly
> designed for priveledged userspace.


I think it's the same with TUN/TAP, privileged process can pass them to 
unprivileged ones.


>
>> The only difference is the page was remap to
>> from kernel to userspace.
> At least that avoids the g.u.p mess.


I'm still not very clear at the point. We only pin 2 or 4 pages, they're 
several other cases that will pin much more.


>
>>>     I don't
>>> like the idea I have to say.  As a first step, why don't we switch to
>>> unsafe_put_user/unsafe_get_user etc?
>>
>> Several reasons:
>>
>> - They only have x86 variant, it won't have any difference for the rest of
>> architecture.
> Is there an issue on other architectures? If yes they can be extended
> there.


Consider the unexpected amount of work and in the best case it can give 
the same performance to vmap(). I'm not sure it's worth.


>
>> - unsafe_put_user/unsafe_get_user is not sufficient for accessing structures
>> (e.g accessing descriptor) or arrays (batching).
> So you want unsafe_copy_xxx_user? I can do this. Hang on will post.
>
>> - Unless we can batch at least the accessing of two places in three of
>> avail, used and descriptor in one run. There will be no difference. E.g we
>> can batch updating used ring, but it won't make any difference in this case.
>>
> So let's batch them all?


Batching might not help for the case of light load. And we need to 
measure the gain/cost of batching itself.


>
>
>>> That would be more of an apples to apples comparison, would it not?
>>
>> Apples to apples comparison only help if we are the No.1. But the fact is we
>> are not. If we want to compete with e.g dpdk or AF_XDP, vmap() is the
>> fastest method AFAIK.
>>
>>
>> Thanks
> We need to speed up the packet access itself too though.
> You can't vmap all of guest memory.


This series only pin and vmap very few pages (metadata).

Thanks


>
>
>>>
>>>> Test shows about 24% improvement on TX PPS. It should benefit other
>>>> cases as well.
>>>>
>>>> Please review
>>>>
>>>> Jason Wang (3):
>>>>     vhost: generalize adding used elem
>>>>     vhost: fine grain userspace memory accessors
>>>>     vhost: access vq metadata through kernel virtual address
>>>>
>>>>    drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 281 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>>>>    drivers/vhost/vhost.h |  11 ++
>>>>    2 files changed, 266 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> -- 
>>>> 2.17.1

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