[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20181226224142.150866-32-sashal@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 26 Dec 2018 17:41:39 -0500
From: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
To: stable@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.9 32/35] xen/netfront: tolerate frags with no data
From: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
[ Upstream commit d81c5054a5d1d4999c7cdead7636b6cd4af83d36 ]
At least old Xen net backends seem to send frags with no real data
sometimes. In case such a fragment happens to occur with the frag limit
already reached the frontend will BUG currently even if this situation
is easily recoverable.
Modify the BUG_ON() condition accordingly.
Tested-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@...fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
index aceae791baf3..14ceeaaa7fe5 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue,
if (skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags == MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
unsigned int pull_to = NETFRONT_SKB_CB(skb)->pull_to;
- BUG_ON(pull_to <= skb_headlen(skb));
+ BUG_ON(pull_to < skb_headlen(skb));
__pskb_pull_tail(skb, pull_to - skb_headlen(skb));
}
if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)) {
--
2.19.1
Powered by blists - more mailing lists