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Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2019 23:57:10 +0100
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
To: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: ast@...nel.org, jannh@...gle.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf 5/9] bpf: restrict stack pointer arithmetic for
unpriviledged
On 01/01/2019 10:20 PM, David Miller wrote:
> From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
> Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2019 21:49:21 +0100
>
>> Restrict stack pointer arithmetic for unpriviledged users in that
>> arithmetic itself must not go out of bounds as opposed to the actual
>> access later on. Therefore after each adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() with
>> a stack pointer as a destination we simulate a check_stack_access()
>> of 1 byte on the destination and once that fails the program is
>> rejected for unpriviledged program loads. This is analoge to map
> ^^^^^^^
>
> Should be "analog".
Thanks for spotting, I'll fix the typos up in v2 shortly.
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