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Message-ID: <9e4dfe7c-42cc-3dba-763a-23ce4e10389b@hartkopp.net>
Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 20:31:51 +0100
From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>
To: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@...e.cz>
Cc: davem@...emloft.net, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
ieatmuttonchuan@...il.com, meissner@...e.de,
linux-can@...r.kernel.org, linux-stable <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] can: gw: ensure DLC boundaries after CAN frame
modification
Hi Michal,
On 1/3/19 3:01 PM, Michal Kubecek wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 03, 2019 at 01:26:34PM +0100, Oliver Hartkopp wrote:
(..)
>> /* check for checksum updates when the CAN frame has been modified */
>> if (modidx) {
>> + /* ensure DLC boundaries after the different mods */
>> + if (cf->can_dlc > 8)
>> + cf->can_dlc = 8;
>> +
>> if (gwj->mod.csumfunc.crc8)
>> (*gwj->mod.csumfunc.crc8)(cf, &gwj->mod.csum.crc8);
>>
>
> IMHO "8" should rather be "CAN_MAX_DLEN". I can see two problems with
> your patch:
>
> 1. If I understand the code correctly, canfd_frame packets (which allow
> larger lenth) are also processed by this code path.
In fact the can-gw frame modification and checksum functionalities lack
CAN FD support today.
If you take a look into the netlink API only struct can_frame's can be
supplied for frame modifications - and so are the checks e.g. in
cgw_chk_csum_parms().
The given patch fixes the problem as described in the commit message in
all stable Linux versions since can-gw appeared in Linux 3.2.
Anyway your modification makes definitely sense, as it allows to process
CAN FD frames in struct canfd_frame as long as only data is modified
that is also available in a struct can_frame. AND - as a bonus - it
should work for stable 3.2 too, when CAN FD was not even introduced.
Good idea!
If it's ok for you I would like to re-send the patch together with the
CVE number and would like to credit your suggestion in the text and with
"Suggested-by:".
> As reported to security list, cgw_csum_xor_rel() with negative offset can
> then rewrite e.g. frag_list pointer in skb_shared_info, crashing the
> system. With unprivileged user namespaces, this can be exploited by any
> regular user.
This is wrong! First there is no negative offset, as can_dlc is a u8
value. Therefore you can try to hit content in the tail of the skb only.
Second can-gw rules can only be configured by *root* and not by any
regular user - and finally it is definitely not namespace related.
So the user root can configure a can-gw rule to shoot into the skb tail
to kill the machine. I can imagine better things to do when I'm already
root ;-)
Thanks & best regards,
Oliver
>
> Rather than distinguishing between can_frame and canfd_frame, check if
> resulting payload length does not reach beyond nskb->len which is what we
> are actually interested in.
>
> Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@...e.cz>
> ---
> net/can/gw.c | 9 +++++++++
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/can/gw.c b/net/can/gw.c
> index faa3da88a127..87b7043e3250 100644
> --- a/net/can/gw.c
> +++ b/net/can/gw.c
> @@ -418,6 +418,15 @@ static void can_can_gw_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data)
>
> /* check for checksum updates when the CAN frame has been modified */
> if (modidx) {
> + int max_dlc = nskb->len - offsetof(struct can_frame, data);
> +
> + /* dlc may have changed, check the new value */
> + if (cf->can_dlc > max_dlc) {
> + gwj->dropped_frames++;
> + kfree_skb(nskb);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> if (gwj->mod.csumfunc.crc8)
> (*gwj->mod.csumfunc.crc8)(cf, &gwj->mod.csum.crc8);
>
>
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