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Message-Id: <20190105235438.5944-2-daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Sun, 6 Jan 2019 00:54:37 +0100
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
To: ast@...nel.org
Cc: jannh@...gle.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Subject: [PATCH bpf 1/2] bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1 +
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 27b7494..573cca0 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state_list {
#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC 1U
#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST 2U
#define BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE (1U << 2)
+#define BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER (1U << 3)
#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE (BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC | \
BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index f6bc62a..56674a7 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3103,6 +3103,40 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
}
}
+static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ const struct bpf_insn *insn)
+{
+ return env->allow_ptr_leaks || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K;
+}
+
+static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
+ u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit)
+{
+ /* If we arrived here from different branches with different
+ * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work.
+ */
+ if (aux->alu_state &&
+ (aux->alu_state != alu_state ||
+ aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ /* Corresponding fixup done in fixup_bpf_calls(). */
+ aux->alu_state = alu_state;
+ aux->alu_limit = alu_limit;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct bpf_insn *insn)
+{
+ struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
+
+ if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn))
+ return 0;
+
+ return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0);
+}
+
static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
@@ -3117,7 +3151,7 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state tmp;
bool ret;
- if (env->allow_ptr_leaks || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)
+ if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn))
return 0;
/* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative
@@ -3133,19 +3167,8 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, opcode, off_is_neg))
return 0;
-
- /* If we arrived here from different branches with different
- * limits to sanitize, then this won't work.
- */
- if (aux->alu_state &&
- (aux->alu_state != alu_state ||
- aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
+ if (update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit))
return -EACCES;
-
- /* Corresponding fixup done in fixup_bpf_calls(). */
- aux->alu_state = alu_state;
- aux->alu_limit = alu_limit;
-
do_sim:
/* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
* speculative execution from truncation as a result of
@@ -3418,6 +3441,8 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
u64 umin_val, umax_val;
u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32;
+ u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
+ int ret;
if (insn_bitness == 32) {
/* Relevant for 32-bit RSH: Information can propagate towards
@@ -3452,6 +3477,11 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
+ ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different pointers or scalars\n", dst);
+ return ret;
+ }
if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
@@ -3471,6 +3501,11 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_SUB:
+ ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d tried to sub from different pointers or scalars\n", dst);
+ return ret;
+ }
if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
--
2.9.5
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