netdev - [PATCH] can: bcm: check timer values before ktime conversion

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Message-Id: <20190112215726.2622-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Date:   Sat, 12 Jan 2019 22:57:26 +0100
From:   Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>
To:     davem@...emloft.net, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-can@...r.kernel.org, lifeasageek@...il.com,
        threeearcat@...il.com, syzkaller@...glegroups.com,
        Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>,
        Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@...il.com>,
        linux-stable <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] can: bcm: check timer values before ktime conversion

Kyungtae Kim detected a potential integer overflow in bcm_[rx|tx]_setup() when
the conversion into ktime multiplies the given value with NSEC_PER_USEC (1000).

Reference: https://marc.info/?l=linux-can&m=154732118819828&w=2

Add a check for the given tv_usec, so that the value stays below one second.
Additionally limit the tv_sec value to a reasonable value for CAN related
use-cases of 15 minutes.

Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@...il.com>
Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>
Cc: linux-stable <stable@...r.kernel.org> # >= 2.6.26
---
 net/can/bcm.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index 0af8f0db892a..ff3799be077b 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@
  */
 #define MAX_NFRAMES 256
 
+/* limit timers to 15 minutes for sending/timeouts */
+#define BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX (15*60)
+
 /* use of last_frames[index].flags */
 #define RX_RECV    0x40 /* received data for this element */
 #define RX_THR     0x80 /* element not been sent due to throttle feature */
@@ -140,6 +143,18 @@ static inline ktime_t bcm_timeval_to_ktime(struct bcm_timeval tv)
 	return ktime_set(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec * NSEC_PER_USEC);
 }
 
+/* check limitations for timeval provided by user */
+static int bcm_is_invalid_tv(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head)
+{
+	if ((msg_head->ival1.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) ||
+	    (msg_head->ival1.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC) ||
+	    (msg_head->ival2.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) ||
+	    (msg_head->ival2.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC))
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #define CFSIZ(flags) ((flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) ? CANFD_MTU : CAN_MTU)
 #define OPSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_op)
 #define MHSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_msg_head)
@@ -873,6 +888,10 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
 	if (msg_head->nframes < 1 || msg_head->nframes > MAX_NFRAMES)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* check timeval limitations */
+	if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* check the given can_id */
 	op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head, ifindex);
 	if (op) {
@@ -1053,6 +1072,10 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
 	     (!(msg_head->can_id & CAN_RTR_FLAG))))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* check timeval limitations */
+	if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* check the given can_id */
 	op = bcm_find_op(&bo->rx_ops, msg_head, ifindex);
 	if (op) {
-- 
2.20.1