netdev - Re: [PATCH 1/2 v2] kprobe: Do not use uaccess functions to access kernel memory that can fault

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Message-ID: <20190223000355.wpmku2gu6cg3dklh@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com>
Date:   Fri, 22 Feb 2019 16:03:56 -0800
From:   Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc:     Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Nadav Amit <namit@...are.com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Changbin Du <changbin.du@...il.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        "bpf@...r.kernel.org" <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
        Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2 v2] kprobe: Do not use uaccess functions to access
 kernel memory that can fault

On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 03:59:30PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >
> > A relatively simple approach might be to teach BPF not to run kprobe
> > programs and such in contexts where current->mm isn't the active mm?
> > Maybe using nmi_uaccess_okay(), or something like that? It looks like
> > perf_callchain_user() also already uses that. Except that a lot of
> > this code is x86-specific...
> 
> This sounds like exactly the right solution.  If you're running from
> some unknown context (like NMI or tracing), then you should check
> nmi_uaccess_okay().  I think we should just promote that to be a
> non-arch-specific function (that returns true by default) and check it
> the relevant bpf_probe_xyz() functions.
> 
> Alexei, does that seem reasonable?

yep. I think that should work.