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Message-Id: <20190311215125.17793-3-daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 22:51:18 +0100
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
To: ast@...nel.org
Cc: bpf@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, joe@...d.net.nz,
john.fastabend@...il.com, yhs@...com, andrii.nakryiko@...il.com,
jakub.kicinski@...ronome.com, tgraf@...g.ch, lmb@...udflare.com,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Subject: [PATCH rfc v3 bpf-next 2/9] bpf: add program side {rd,wr}only support for maps
This work adds two new map creation flags BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG
and BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG in order to allow for read-only or
write-only BPF maps from a BPF program side.
Today we have BPF_F_RDONLY and BPF_F_WRONLY, but this only
applies to system call side, meaning the BPF program has full
read/write access to the map as usual while bpf(2) calls with
map fd can either only read or write into the map depending
on the flags. BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG and BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG allows
for the exact opposite such that verifier is going to reject
program loads if write into a read-only map or a read into a
write-only map is detected. For read-only map case also some
helpers are forbidden for programs that would alter the map
state such as map deletion, update, etc.
We've enabled this generic map extension to various non-special
maps holding normal user data: array, hash, lru, lpm, local
storage, queue and stack. Further map types could be followed
up in future depending on use-case. Main use case here is to
forbid writes into .rodata map values from verifier side.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 10 +++++++-
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 3 ++-
kernel/bpf/hashtab.c | 6 ++---
kernel/bpf/local_storage.c | 6 ++---
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c | 3 ++-
kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c | 6 ++---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 ++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
9 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 85b6b5dc883f..bb80c78924b0 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -427,6 +427,30 @@ struct bpf_array {
};
};
+#define BPF_MAP_CAN_READ BIT(0)
+#define BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE BIT(1)
+
+static inline u32 bpf_map_flags_to_cap(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+ u32 access_flags = map->map_flags & (BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG);
+
+ /* Combination of BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG is
+ * not possible.
+ */
+ if (access_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG)
+ return BPF_MAP_CAN_READ;
+ else if (access_flags & BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG)
+ return BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE;
+ else
+ return BPF_MAP_CAN_READ | BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE;
+}
+
+static inline bool bpf_map_flags_access_ok(u32 access_flags)
+{
+ return (access_flags & (BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG)) !=
+ (BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG);
+}
+
#define MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT 32
struct bpf_event_entry {
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index d0b80fce0fc9..e64fd9862e68 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ enum bpf_attach_type {
#define BPF_OBJ_NAME_LEN 16U
-/* Flags for accessing BPF object */
+/* Flags for accessing BPF object from syscall side. */
#define BPF_F_RDONLY (1U << 3)
#define BPF_F_WRONLY (1U << 4)
@@ -304,6 +304,14 @@ enum bpf_attach_type {
/* Zero-initialize hash function seed. This should only be used for testing. */
#define BPF_F_ZERO_SEED (1U << 6)
+/* Flags for accessing BPF object from program side. */
+#define BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG (1U << 7)
+#define BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG (1U << 8)
+#define BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK (BPF_F_RDONLY | \
+ BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | \
+ BPF_F_WRONLY | \
+ BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG)
+
/* flags for BPF_PROG_QUERY */
#define BPF_F_QUERY_EFFECTIVE (1U << 0)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
index 862d20422ad1..6d2ce06485ae 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
#include "map_in_map.h"
#define ARRAY_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
- (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY)
+ (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK)
static void bpf_array_free_percpu(struct bpf_array *array)
{
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ int array_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr)
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
attr->value_size == 0 ||
attr->map_flags & ~ARRAY_CREATE_FLAG_MASK ||
+ !bpf_map_flags_access_ok(attr->map_flags) ||
(percpu && numa_node != NUMA_NO_NODE))
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
index fed15cf94dca..192d32e77db3 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
#define HTAB_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
(BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC | BPF_F_NO_COMMON_LRU | BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | \
- BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY | BPF_F_ZERO_SEED)
+ BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK | BPF_F_ZERO_SEED)
struct bucket {
struct hlist_nulls_head head;
@@ -262,8 +262,8 @@ static int htab_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr)
/* Guard against local DoS, and discourage production use. */
return -EPERM;
- if (attr->map_flags & ~HTAB_CREATE_FLAG_MASK)
- /* reserved bits should not be used */
+ if (attr->map_flags & ~HTAB_CREATE_FLAG_MASK ||
+ !bpf_map_flags_access_ok(attr->map_flags))
return -EINVAL;
if (!lru && percpu_lru)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c
index 6b572e2de7fb..980e8f1f6cb5 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct bpf_cgroup_storage*, bpf_cgroup_storage[MAX_BPF_CGROUP_STO
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF
#define LOCAL_STORAGE_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
- (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY)
+ (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK)
struct bpf_cgroup_storage_map {
struct bpf_map map;
@@ -282,8 +282,8 @@ static struct bpf_map *cgroup_storage_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
if (attr->value_size > PAGE_SIZE)
return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
- if (attr->map_flags & ~LOCAL_STORAGE_CREATE_FLAG_MASK)
- /* reserved bits should not be used */
+ if (attr->map_flags & ~LOCAL_STORAGE_CREATE_FLAG_MASK ||
+ !bpf_map_flags_access_ok(attr->map_flags))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (attr->max_entries)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c
index 93a5cbbde421..e61630c2e50b 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int trie_delete_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *_key)
#define LPM_KEY_SIZE_MIN LPM_KEY_SIZE(LPM_DATA_SIZE_MIN)
#define LPM_CREATE_FLAG_MASK (BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC | BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | \
- BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY)
+ BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK)
static struct bpf_map *trie_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
@@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *trie_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
if (attr->max_entries == 0 ||
!(attr->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC) ||
attr->map_flags & ~LPM_CREATE_FLAG_MASK ||
+ !bpf_map_flags_access_ok(attr->map_flags) ||
attr->key_size < LPM_KEY_SIZE_MIN ||
attr->key_size > LPM_KEY_SIZE_MAX ||
attr->value_size < LPM_VAL_SIZE_MIN ||
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c b/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c
index b384ea9f3254..0b140d236889 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c
@@ -11,8 +11,7 @@
#include "percpu_freelist.h"
#define QUEUE_STACK_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
- (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY)
-
+ (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK)
struct bpf_queue_stack {
struct bpf_map map;
@@ -52,7 +51,8 @@ static int queue_stack_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr)
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 0 ||
attr->value_size == 0 ||
- attr->map_flags & ~QUEUE_STACK_CREATE_FLAG_MASK)
+ attr->map_flags & ~QUEUE_STACK_CREATE_FLAG_MASK ||
+ !bpf_map_flags_access_ok(attr->map_flags))
return -EINVAL;
if (attr->value_size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index b0c7a6485c49..ba2fe4cfad09 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -481,6 +481,8 @@ static int map_check_btf(struct bpf_map *map, const struct btf *btf,
map->spin_lock_off = btf_find_spin_lock(btf, value_type);
if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) {
+ if (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG)
+ return -EACCES;
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH &&
map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY &&
map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 57678cef9a2c..af3cddb18efb 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1429,6 +1429,28 @@ static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return 0;
}
+static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
+ int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type)
+{
+ struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
+ struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr;
+ u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map);
+
+ if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) {
+ verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
+ map->value_size, off, size);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) {
+ verbose(env, "read into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
+ map->value_size, off, size);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
static int __check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
int size, bool zero_size_allowed)
@@ -2014,7 +2036,9 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno);
return -EACCES;
}
-
+ err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false);
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
@@ -2250,6 +2274,10 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
zero_size_allowed);
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+ if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
+ meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE :
+ BPF_READ))
+ return -EACCES;
return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
zero_size_allowed);
default: /* scalar_value|ptr_to_stack or invalid ptr */
@@ -2971,6 +2999,7 @@ record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
int func_id, int insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
+ struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr;
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
@@ -2981,11 +3010,24 @@ record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem)
return 0;
- if (meta->map_ptr == NULL) {
+ if (map == NULL) {
verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions
+ * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the
+ * state of the map from program side.
+ */
+ if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) &&
+ (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem ||
+ func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem ||
+ func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem ||
+ func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) {
+ verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n");
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_state))
bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr,
meta->map_ptr->unpriv_array);
--
2.17.1
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