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Message-ID: <CAEf4BzaDc2n662LcmjJoSir0G8YsrT_qKnfNyzEALy4mdJ-7Fw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:26:12 -0700
From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com>
To: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Joe Stringer <joe@...d.net.nz>,
john fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@...ronome.com>, tgraf@...g.ch,
lmb@...udflare.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH rfc v3 bpf-next 2/9] bpf: add program side {rd,wr}only
support for maps
On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 2:51 PM Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net> wrote:
>
> This work adds two new map creation flags BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG
> and BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG in order to allow for read-only or
> write-only BPF maps from a BPF program side.
>
> Today we have BPF_F_RDONLY and BPF_F_WRONLY, but this only
> applies to system call side, meaning the BPF program has full
> read/write access to the map as usual while bpf(2) calls with
> map fd can either only read or write into the map depending
> on the flags. BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG and BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG allows
> for the exact opposite such that verifier is going to reject
> program loads if write into a read-only map or a read into a
> write-only map is detected. For read-only map case also some
> helpers are forbidden for programs that would alter the map
> state such as map deletion, update, etc.
>
> We've enabled this generic map extension to various non-special
> maps holding normal user data: array, hash, lru, lpm, local
> storage, queue and stack. Further map types could be followed
> up in future depending on use-case. Main use case here is to
> forbid writes into .rodata map values from verifier side.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
> ---
> include/linux/bpf.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 10 +++++++-
> kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 3 ++-
> kernel/bpf/hashtab.c | 6 ++---
> kernel/bpf/local_storage.c | 6 ++---
> kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c | 3 ++-
> kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c | 6 ++---
> kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 ++
> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 9 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
> index 85b6b5dc883f..bb80c78924b0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/bpf.h
> +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
> @@ -427,6 +427,30 @@ struct bpf_array {
> };
> };
>
> +#define BPF_MAP_CAN_READ BIT(0)
> +#define BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE BIT(1)
> +
> +static inline u32 bpf_map_flags_to_cap(struct bpf_map *map)
> +{
> + u32 access_flags = map->map_flags & (BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG);
> +
> + /* Combination of BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG is
> + * not possible.
> + */
> + if (access_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG)
> + return BPF_MAP_CAN_READ;
> + else if (access_flags & BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG)
> + return BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE;
> + else
> + return BPF_MAP_CAN_READ | BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE;
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool bpf_map_flags_access_ok(u32 access_flags)
> +{
> + return (access_flags & (BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG)) !=
> + (BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG);
> +}
> +
> #define MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT 32
>
> struct bpf_event_entry {
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> index d0b80fce0fc9..e64fd9862e68 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ enum bpf_attach_type {
>
> #define BPF_OBJ_NAME_LEN 16U
>
> -/* Flags for accessing BPF object */
> +/* Flags for accessing BPF object from syscall side. */
> #define BPF_F_RDONLY (1U << 3)
> #define BPF_F_WRONLY (1U << 4)
>
> @@ -304,6 +304,14 @@ enum bpf_attach_type {
> /* Zero-initialize hash function seed. This should only be used for testing. */
> #define BPF_F_ZERO_SEED (1U << 6)
>
> +/* Flags for accessing BPF object from program side. */
> +#define BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG (1U << 7)
> +#define BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG (1U << 8)
> +#define BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK (BPF_F_RDONLY | \
> + BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | \
> + BPF_F_WRONLY | \
> + BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG)
> +
> /* flags for BPF_PROG_QUERY */
> #define BPF_F_QUERY_EFFECTIVE (1U << 0)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
> index 862d20422ad1..6d2ce06485ae 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
> @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
> #include "map_in_map.h"
>
> #define ARRAY_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
> - (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY)
> + (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK)
>
> static void bpf_array_free_percpu(struct bpf_array *array)
> {
> @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ int array_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr)
> if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
> attr->value_size == 0 ||
> attr->map_flags & ~ARRAY_CREATE_FLAG_MASK ||
> + !bpf_map_flags_access_ok(attr->map_flags) ||
> (percpu && numa_node != NUMA_NO_NODE))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
> index fed15cf94dca..192d32e77db3 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
> @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
>
> #define HTAB_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
> (BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC | BPF_F_NO_COMMON_LRU | BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | \
> - BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY | BPF_F_ZERO_SEED)
> + BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK | BPF_F_ZERO_SEED)
>
> struct bucket {
> struct hlist_nulls_head head;
> @@ -262,8 +262,8 @@ static int htab_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr)
> /* Guard against local DoS, and discourage production use. */
> return -EPERM;
>
> - if (attr->map_flags & ~HTAB_CREATE_FLAG_MASK)
> - /* reserved bits should not be used */
> + if (attr->map_flags & ~HTAB_CREATE_FLAG_MASK ||
> + !bpf_map_flags_access_ok(attr->map_flags))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> if (!lru && percpu_lru)
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c
> index 6b572e2de7fb..980e8f1f6cb5 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c
> @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct bpf_cgroup_storage*, bpf_cgroup_storage[MAX_BPF_CGROUP_STO
> #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF
>
> #define LOCAL_STORAGE_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
> - (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY)
> + (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK)
>
> struct bpf_cgroup_storage_map {
> struct bpf_map map;
> @@ -282,8 +282,8 @@ static struct bpf_map *cgroup_storage_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
> if (attr->value_size > PAGE_SIZE)
> return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
>
> - if (attr->map_flags & ~LOCAL_STORAGE_CREATE_FLAG_MASK)
> - /* reserved bits should not be used */
> + if (attr->map_flags & ~LOCAL_STORAGE_CREATE_FLAG_MASK ||
> + !bpf_map_flags_access_ok(attr->map_flags))
> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>
> if (attr->max_entries)
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c
> index 93a5cbbde421..e61630c2e50b 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c
> @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int trie_delete_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *_key)
> #define LPM_KEY_SIZE_MIN LPM_KEY_SIZE(LPM_DATA_SIZE_MIN)
>
> #define LPM_CREATE_FLAG_MASK (BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC | BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | \
> - BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY)
> + BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK)
>
> static struct bpf_map *trie_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
> {
> @@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *trie_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
> if (attr->max_entries == 0 ||
> !(attr->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC) ||
> attr->map_flags & ~LPM_CREATE_FLAG_MASK ||
> + !bpf_map_flags_access_ok(attr->map_flags) ||
> attr->key_size < LPM_KEY_SIZE_MIN ||
> attr->key_size > LPM_KEY_SIZE_MAX ||
> attr->value_size < LPM_VAL_SIZE_MIN ||
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c b/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c
> index b384ea9f3254..0b140d236889 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c
> @@ -11,8 +11,7 @@
> #include "percpu_freelist.h"
>
> #define QUEUE_STACK_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
> - (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY)
> -
> + (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK)
>
> struct bpf_queue_stack {
> struct bpf_map map;
> @@ -52,7 +51,8 @@ static int queue_stack_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr)
> /* check sanity of attributes */
> if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 0 ||
> attr->value_size == 0 ||
> - attr->map_flags & ~QUEUE_STACK_CREATE_FLAG_MASK)
> + attr->map_flags & ~QUEUE_STACK_CREATE_FLAG_MASK ||
> + !bpf_map_flags_access_ok(attr->map_flags))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> if (attr->value_size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE)
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> index b0c7a6485c49..ba2fe4cfad09 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> @@ -481,6 +481,8 @@ static int map_check_btf(struct bpf_map *map, const struct btf *btf,
> map->spin_lock_off = btf_find_spin_lock(btf, value_type);
>
> if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) {
> + if (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG)
> + return -EACCES;
Do we need to enforce this restriction? This would make sense if we
were enforcing that any element that has spinlock inside has to have a
lock taken, do we do that in verifier?
> if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH &&
> map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY &&
> map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE)
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index 57678cef9a2c..af3cddb18efb 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -1429,6 +1429,28 @@ static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
> + int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type)
> +{
> + struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
> + struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr;
> + u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map);
> +
> + if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) {
> + verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
> + map->value_size, off, size);
> + return -EACCES;
> + }
> +
> + if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) {
> + verbose(env, "read into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
typo: "read from"?
> + map->value_size, off, size);
> + return -EACCES;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
> static int __check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
> int size, bool zero_size_allowed)
> @@ -2014,7 +2036,9 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
> verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno);
> return -EACCES;
> }
> -
> + err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false);
> if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
> mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
> @@ -2250,6 +2274,10 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
> return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
> zero_size_allowed);
> case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
> + if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
> + meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE :
> + BPF_READ))
> + return -EACCES;
> return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
> zero_size_allowed);
> default: /* scalar_value|ptr_to_stack or invalid ptr */
> @@ -2971,6 +2999,7 @@ record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
> int func_id, int insn_idx)
> {
> struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
> + struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr;
>
> if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call &&
> func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
> @@ -2981,11 +3010,24 @@ record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
> func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem)
> return 0;
>
> - if (meta->map_ptr == NULL) {
> + if (map == NULL) {
> verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> + /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions
> + * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the
> + * state of the map from program side.
> + */
> + if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) &&
> + (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem ||
> + func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem ||
> + func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem ||
> + func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) {
Curious, what about tail_calls? Is it considered a read? Is this
checked as well?
> + verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n");
> + return -EACCES;
> + }
> +
> if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_state))
> bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr,
> meta->map_ptr->unpriv_array);
> --
> 2.17.1
>
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